TITLE 20
PERSONAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Chapter
01 The Nature Of Obligations
02 Conditional Obligations
03 Alternative Obligations
04 Performance Of Obligations
05 Offer Of Performance Of Obligations
06 Excuses For Want Of Performance
07 Accord And Satisfaction, Novation And Release Of Obligations
08 Restoration Of Things Improperly Obtained
09 Liability For Torts
10 Liability For Deceit
10A Liability For Disparagement Of Agricultural Food Products
11 Liability For Defamation
11A Powers And Obligations Of Persons Of Unsound Mind
12 Municipal And County Protection Of Human Rights
13 Human Rights
14 Commission On Status Of Women [Repealed]
15 Accessibility Law Violations
20-1-1
Obligation defined.
20-1-2
Origin of obligations.
20-1-3
Kinds of obligations arising by operation of law.
20-1-4
Joint and several obligations and rights.
20-1-5
Obligations and rights presumed joint and not several.
20-1-6
Right of contribution on satisfaction of joint obligation.
20-1-1. Obligation defined.
An obligation is a legal duty by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing.
Source: CivC 1877, § 798; CL 1887, § 3421; RCivC 1903, § 1114; RC 1919, § 721; SDC 1939, § 47.0101.
20-1-2. Origin of obligations.
An obligation arises either from:
(1) The contract of the parties; or
(2) The operation of law.
Source: CivC 1877, § 799; CL 1887, § 3422; RCivC 1903, § 1115; RC 1919, § 722; SDC 1939, § 47.0102.
20-1-3. Kinds of obligations arising by operation of law.
An obligation arising by operation of law may be either a general legal duty imposed upon all persons indifferently by law or a legal duty affixed by operation of law to a status or relationship voluntarily assumed.
Source: SDC 1939, § 47.0103.
20-1-4. Joint and several obligations and rights.
An obligation imposed upon several persons, or a right created in favor of several persons may be:
(1) Joint;
(2) Several; or
(3) Joint and several.
Source: CivC 1877, § 801; CL 1887, § 3424; RCivC 1903, § 1117; RC 1919, § 724; SDC 1939, § 47.0104.
20-1-5. Obligations and rights presumed joint and not several.
An obligation imposed upon several persons, or a right created in favor of several persons, is presumed to be joint, and not several, except in the special cases mentioned in §§ 53-2-4 and 53-2-5. This presumption, in the case of a right, can be overcome only by express words to the contrary.
Source: CivC 1877, § 802; CL 1887, § 3425; RCivC 1903, § 1118; RC 1919, § 725; SDC 1939, § 47.0105.
20-1-6. Right of contribution on satisfaction of joint obligation.
A party to a joint, or joint and several, obligation, who satisfies more than his share of the claim against all, may require a proportionate contribution from all the parties joined with him.
Source: CivC 1877, § 803; CL 1887, § 3426; RCivC 1903, § 1119; RC 1919, § 726; SDC 1939, § 47.0106.
20-2-1
Conditional obligation defined.
20-2-2
Impossible or unlawful condition void.
20-2-3
Strict interpretation of condition involving forfeiture.
20-2-4
Kinds and definition of conditions.
20-2-5
Fulfillment of conditions before requiring performance.
20-2-6
Performance of conditions waived by notice of nonperformance by other party.
20-2-1. Conditional obligation defined.
An obligation is conditional when the rights or duties of any party thereto depend upon the occurrence of an uncertain event.
Source: CivC 1877, § 804; CL 1887, § 3427; RCivC 1903, § 1120; RC 1919, § 727; SDC 1939, § 47.0107.
20-2-2. Impossible or unlawful condition void.
A condition in a contract, the fulfillment of which is impossible or unlawful, within the meaning of chapter 53-5 relating to the object of contracts, or which is repugnant to the nature of the interest created by the contract is void.
Source: CivC 1877, § 811; CL 1887, § 3434; RCivC 1903, § 1127; RC 1919, § 734; SDC 1939, § 47.0111.
20-2-3. Strict interpretation of condition involving forfeiture.
A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is created.
Source: CivC 1877, § 812; CL 1887, § 3435; RCivC 1903, § 1128; RC 1919, § 735; SDC 1939, § 47.0112.
20-2-4. Kinds and definition of conditions.
Conditions may be precedent, concurrent, or subsequent. A condition precedent is one which is to be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed. Conditions concurrent are those which are mutually dependent, and are to be performed at the same time. A condition subsequent is one referring to a future event, upon happening of which the obligation becomes no longer binding upon the other party, if he chooses to avail himself of the condition.
Source: CivC 1877, §§ 805 to 808; CL 1887, §§ 3428 to 3431; RCivC 1903, §§ 1121 to 1124; RC 1919, §§ 728 to 731; SDC 1939, § 47.0108.
20-2-5. Fulfillment of conditions before requiring performance.
Before any party to an obligation can require another party to perform any act under it, he must fulfill all conditions precedent thereto imposed upon himself; and must be able, and offer, to fulfill all conditions concurrent, so imposed upon him, on the like fulfillment by the other party, except as provided by § 20-2-6.
Source: CivC 1877, § 809; CL 1887, § 3432; RCivC 1903, § 1125; RC 1919, § 732; SDC 1939, § 47.0109.
20-2-6. Performance of conditions waived by notice of nonperformance by other party.
If a party to an obligation gives notice to another, before the latter is in default, that he will not perform the same upon his part, and does not retract such notice before the time at which performance upon his part is due, such other party is entitled to enforce the obligation without previously performing, or offering to perform, any conditions on his part, in favor of the former party.
Source: CivC 1877, § 810; CL 1887, § 3433; RCivC 1903, § 1126; RC 1919, § 733; SDC 1939, § 47.0110.
20-3-1
Alternative obligation defined--Right of selection.
20-3-2
Unlawful or impossible alternative disregarded.
20-3-3
Selection of alternative in entirety.
20-3-4
Selection of alternative if not exercised by party having right.
20-3-1. Alternative obligation defined--Right of selection.
An obligation which requires the performance of one of two acts at the option of a party is an alternative obligation. The party required to perform has the right of selection unless the terms of the obligation otherwise provide.
Source: CivC 1877, § 813; CL 1887, § 3436; RCivC 1903, § 1129; RC 1919, § 736; SDC 1939, § 47.0113.
20-3-2. Unlawful or impossible alternative disregarded.
If one of the alternative acts required by an obligation is such as the law will not enforce, or becomes unlawful, or impossible of performance, the obligation is to be interpreted as though the other stood alone.
Source: CivC 1877, § 816; CL 1887, § 3439; RCivC 1903, § 1132; RC 1919, § 739; SDC 1939, § 47.0116.
20-3-3. Selection of alternative in entirety.
The party having the right of selection between alternative acts must select one of them in its entirety, and cannot select part of one and part of another, without the consent of the other party.
Source: CivC 1877, § 815; CL 1887, § 3438; RCivC 1903, § 1131; RC 1919, § 738; SDC 1939, § 47.0115.
20-3-4. Selection of alternative if not exercised by party having right.
If the party having the right of selection between alternative acts does not give notice of his selection to the other party within the time, if any, fixed by the obligation for that purpose, or, if none is so fixed, before the time at which the obligation ought to be performed, the right of selection passes to the other party.
Source: CivC 1877, § 814; CL 1887, § 3437; RCivC 1903, § 1130; RC 1919, § 737; SDC 1939, § 47.0114.
20-4-1
Obligation extinguished by full performance.
20-4-2
Joint obligation extinguished by performance by one person.
20-4-3
Joint right extinguished by performance to one person--Deposit excepted.
20-4-4
Obligation extinguished by performance in manner directed by creditor.
20-4-5
Indivisible obligation partially extinguished by partial performance if benefit
voluntarily retained--Exception.
20-4-6
Performance applicable to two or more obligations.
20-4-7
Performance applied according to debtor's intent.
20-4-8
Application of performance according to creditor's selection--Application to rights
held individually and as trustee--Rescission of application made by creditor.
20-4-9
Application of performance in absence of selection by parties.
20-4-1. Obligation extinguished by full performance.
Full performance of an obligation, by the party whose duty it is to perform it, or by any other person on his behalf, and with his assent, if accepted by the creditor, extinguishes it.
Source: CivC 1877, § 827; CL 1887, § 3451; RCivC 1903, § 1144; RC 1919, § 751; SDC 1939, § 47.0201.
20-4-2. Joint obligation extinguished by performance by one person.
Performance of an obligation, by one of several persons who are jointly liable under it, extinguishes the liability of all.
Source: CivC 1877, § 828; CL 1887, § 3452; RCivC 1903, § 1145; RC 1919, § 752; SDC 1939, § 47.0202.
20-4-3. Joint right extinguished by performance to one person--Deposit excepted.
An obligation in favor of several persons is extinguished by performance rendered to any of them, except in the case of a deposit made by owners in common, or in joint ownership, which is regulated by the law on deposit.
Source: CivC 1877, § 829; CL 1887, § 3453; RCivC 1903, § 1146; RC 1919, § 753; SDC 1939, § 47.0203.
20-4-4. Obligation extinguished by performance in manner directed by creditor.
If a creditor, or any one of two or more joint creditors, at any time directs the debtor to perform his obligation in a particular manner, the obligation is extinguished by performance in that manner, even though the creditor does not receive the benefit of such performance.
Source: CivC 1877, § 830; CL 1887, § 3454; RCivC 1903, § 1147; RC 1919, § 754; SDC 1939, § 47.0204.
20-4-5. Indivisible obligation partially extinguished by partial performance if benefit voluntarily retained--Exception.
A partial performance of an indivisible obligation extinguishes a corresponding proportion thereof, if the benefit of such performance is voluntarily retained by the creditor, but not otherwise. If such partial performance is of such a nature that the creditor cannot avoid retaining it, without injuring his own property, his retention thereof is not presumed to be voluntary.
Source: CivC 1877, § 831; CL 1887, § 3455; RCivC 1903, § 1148; RC 1919, § 755; SDC 1939, § 47.0205.
20-4-6. Performance applicable to two or more obligations.
Where a debtor, under several obligations to another, does an act by way of performance in whole or in part, which is equally applicable to two or more of such obligations, such performance must be applied as provided by §§ 20-4-7 to 20-4-9, inclusive.
Source: CivC 1877, § 833; CL 1887, § 3457; RCivC 1903, § 1150; RC 1919, § 757; SDC 1939, § 47.0207.
20-4-7. Performance applied according to debtor's intent.
If, at the time of the performance by a debtor described by § 20-4-6, the intention or desire of the debtor that such performance should be applied to the extinction of any particular obligation, be manifested to the creditor, it must be so applied.
Source: CivC 1877, § 833, subdiv 1; CL 1887, § 3457, subdiv 1; RCivC 1903, § 1150, subdiv 1; RC 1919, § 757 (1); SDC 1939, § 47.0207 (1).
20-4-8. Application of performance according to creditor's selection--Application to rights held individually and as trustee--Rescission of application made by creditor.
If no application be made pursuant to § 20-4-7, the creditor, within a reasonable time after such performance, may apply it toward the extinction of any obligation, performance of which was due to him from the debtor at the time of such performance; except that if similar obligations were due to him, both individually and as a trustee, he must, unless otherwise directed by the debtor, apply the performance to the extinction of all such obligations in equal proportion; and an application once made by the creditor cannot be rescinded without the consent of the debtor.
Source: CivC 1877, § 833, subdiv 2; CL 1887, § 3457, subdiv 2; RCivC 1903, § 1150, subdiv 2; RC 1919, § 757 (2); SDC 1939, § 47.0207 (2).
20-4-9. Application of performance in absence of selection by parties.
If neither party makes application pursuant to § 20-4-7 or § 20-4-8 within a reasonable time after performance, the performance must be applied to the extinction of obligations in the following order; and if there be more than one obligation of a particular class, to the extinction of all in that class, ratably:
(1) Of interest due at the time of the performance;
(2) Of principal due at that time;
(3) Of the obligation earliest in date of maturity;
(4) Of an obligation not secured by a lien or collateral undertaking;
(5) Of an obligation secured by a lien or collateral undertaking.
Source: CivC 1877, § 833, subdiv 3; CL 1887, § 3457, subdiv 3; RCivC 1903, § 1150, subdiv 3; RC 1919, § 757 (3); SDC 1939, § 47.0207 (3).
20-5-1
Obligation extinguished by offer of performance.
20-5-2
Offer of partial performance.
20-5-3
Offer of performance made by or on behalf of debtor.
20-5-4
Offer of performance made to creditor or authorized person.
20-5-5
Place of offer of performance.
20-5-6
Time of offer of performance.
20-5-7
Delayed offer of performance with compensation for delay.
20-5-8
Good faith offer required.
20-5-9
Offer to be free from conditions.
20-5-10
Ability and willingness to perform required for offer.
20-5-11
Tender of delivery not required until offer accepted.
20-5-12
Thing offered to be separable.
20-5-13
Conditional offer permitted.
20-5-14
Receipt for property delivered in performance.
20-5-15
Waiver by failure to state objections to mode of offer.
20-5-16
Passage of title to thing offered in performance.
20-5-17
Retention of thing offered until acceptance by creditor.
20-5-18
Interest stopped by offer of performance.
20-5-19
Retention by creditor of thing not accepted as performance.
20-5-1. Obligation extinguished by offer of performance.
An obligation is extinguished by an offer of performance, made in conformity to the rules prescribed in this chapter, and with intent to extinguish the obligation.
Source: CivC 1877, § 834; CL 1887, § 3458; RCivC 1903, § 1151; RC 1919, § 758; SDC 1939, § 47.0208.
20-5-2. Offer of partial performance.
An offer of partial performance is of no effect.
Source: CivC 1877, § 835; CL 1887, § 3459; RCivC 1903, § 1152; RC 1919, § 759; SDC 1939, § 47.0210.
20-5-3. Offer of performance made by or on behalf of debtor.
An offer of performance must be made by the debtor, or by some person on his behalf and with his assent.
Source: CivC 1877, § 836; CL 1887, § 3460; RCivC 1903, § 1153; RC 1919, § 760; SDC 1939, § 47.0211.
20-5-4. Offer of performance made to creditor or authorized person.
An offer of performance must be made to the creditor, or to any one of two or more joint creditors, or to a person authorized by one or more of them to receive or collect what is due under the obligation, if such creditor or authorized person is present at the place where the offer may be made; and if not, wherever the creditor may be found.
Source: CivC 1877, § 837; CL 1887, § 3461; RCivC 1903, § 1154; RC 1919, § 761; SDC 1939, § 47.0212.
20-5-5. Place of offer of performance.
In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, an offer of performance may be made, at the option of the debtor:
(1) At any place appointed by the creditor;
(2) Wherever the person to whom the offer ought to be made can be found;
(3) If such person cannot, with reasonable diligence, be found within this state, and within a reasonable distance from his residence or place of business, or if he evades the debtor, then at his residence or place of business, if the same can, with reasonable diligence, be found within the state; or
(4) If this cannot be done, then at any place within the state.
Source: CivC 1877, § 838; CL 1887, § 3462; RCivC 1903, § 1155; RC 1919, § 762; SDC 1939, § 47.0213.
20-5-6. Time of offer of performance.
Where an obligation fixes a time for its performance, an offer of performance must be made at that time, within reasonable hours, and not before nor afterwards. Where an obligation does not fix a time for its performance, an offer of performance may be made at any time before the debtor, upon a reasonable demand, has refused to perform.
Source: CivC 1877, §§ 839, 840; CL 1887, §§ 3463, 3464; RCivC 1903, §§ 1156, 1157; RC 1919, §§ 763, 764; SDC 1939, § 47.0214.
20-5-7. Delayed offer of performance with compensation for delay.
Where delay in performance is capable of exact and entire compensation, and time has not been expressly declared to be of the essence of the obligation, an offer of performance accompanied with an offer of such compensation, may be made at any time after it is due, but without prejudice to any rights acquired by the creditor or by any other person in the meantime.
Source: CivC 1877, § 841; CL 1887, § 3465; RCivC 1903, § 1158; RC 1919, § 765; SDC 1939, § 47.0215.
20-5-8. Good faith offer required.
An offer of performance must be made in good faith, and in such manner as is most likely, under the circumstances, to benefit the creditor.
Source: CivC 1877, § 842; CL 1887, § 3466; RCivC 1903, § 1159; RC 1919, § 766; SDC 1939, § 47.0216.
20-5-9. Offer to be free from conditions.
An offer of performance must be free from any condition which the creditor is not bound on his part to perform.
Source: CivC 1877, § 843; CL 1887, § 3467; RCivC 1903, § 1160; RC 1919, § 767; SDC 1939, § 47.0217.
20-5-10. Ability and willingness to perform required for offer.
An offer of performance is of no effect if the person making it is not able and willing to perform according to the offer.
Source: CivC 1877, § 844; CL 1887, § 3468; RCivC 1903, § 1161; RC 1919, § 768; SDC 1939, § 47.0218.
20-5-11. Tender of delivery not required until offer accepted.
The thing to be delivered, if any, need not in any case be actually produced upon an offer of performance, unless the offer is accepted.
Source: CivC 1877, § 845; CL 1887, § 3469; RCivC 1903, § 1162; RC 1919, § 769; SDC 1939, § 47.0219.
20-5-12. Thing offered to be separable.
A thing, when offered by way of performance, must not be mixed with other things from which it cannot be separated immediately and without difficulty.
Source: CivC 1877, § 846; CL 1887, § 3470; RCivC 1903, § 1163; RC 1919, § 770; SDC 1939, § 47.0220.
20-5-13. Conditional offer permitted.
When a debtor is entitled to the performance of a condition precedent to, or concurrent with, performance on his part, he may make his offer to depend upon the due performance of such condition.
Source: CivC 1877, § 847; CL 1887, § 3471; RCivC 1903, § 1164; RC 1919, § 771; SDC 1939, § 47.0221.
20-5-14. Receipt for property delivered in performance.
A debtor has a right to require from his creditor a written receipt for any property delivered in performance of his obligation.
Source: CivC 1877, § 848; CL 1887, § 3472; RCivC 1903, § 1165; RC 1919, § 772; SDC 1939, § 47.0222.
20-5-15. Waiver by failure to state objections to mode of offer.
All objections to the mode of an offer of performance, which the creditor has an opportunity to state at the time to the person making the offer, and which could be then obviated by him, are waived by the creditor, if not then stated.
Source: CivC 1877, § 850; CL 1887, § 3474; RCivC 1903, § 1167; RC 1919, § 774; SDC 1939, § 47.0223.
20-5-16. Passage of title to thing offered in performance.
The title to a thing duly offered in performance of an obligation passes to the creditor, if the debtor at the time signifies his intention to that effect.
Source: CivC 1877, § 851; CL 1887, § 3475; RCivC 1903, § 1168; RC 1919, § 775; SDC 1939, § 47.0224.
20-5-17. Retention of thing offered until acceptance by creditor.
The person offering a thing, other than money, by way of performance, must, if he means to treat it as belonging to the creditor, retain it as a depository for hire until the creditor accepts it, or until he has given reasonable notice to the creditor that he will retain it no longer; and if, with reasonable diligence, he can find a suitable depository therefor, until he has deposited it with such person.
Source: CivC 1877, § 852; CL 1887, § 3476; RCivC 1903, § 1169; RC 1919, § 776; SDC 1939, § 47.0225.
20-5-18. Interest stopped by offer of performance.
An offer of payment or other performance, duly made, though the title to the thing offered be not transferred to the creditor, stops the running of interest on the obligation, and has the same effect upon all its incidents as a performance thereof.
Source: CivC 1877, § 853; CL 1887, § 3477; RCivC 1903, § 1171; RC 1919, § 778; SDC 1939, § 47.0227.
20-5-19. Retention by creditor of thing not accepted as performance.
If anything is given to a creditor by way of performance, which he refuses to accept as such, he is not bound to return it without demand; but if he retains it, he is gratuitous depository thereof.
Source: CivC 1877, § 854; CL 1887, § 3478; RCivC 1903, § 1172; RC 1919, § 779; SDC 1939, § 47.0228.
20-6-1
Want of performance or delay excused.
20-6-2
Uncontrollable cause excusing want or delay of performance.
20-6-3
Want or delay of performance excused by creditor's act inducing nonperformance.
20-6-4
Want or delay of performance excused by creditor's act or operation of law
preventing performance.
20-6-5
Debtor entitled to benefits when performance prevented by creditor.
20-6-6
Debtor entitled to portion of benefits when performance prevented other than by
creditor.
20-6-7
Refusal of performance before offer equivalent to offer and refusal.
20-6-1. Want of performance or delay excused.
The want of performance of an obligation, or of an offer of performance, in whole or in part, or any delay therein, is excused by the causes described in §§ 20-6-2 to 20-6-4, inclusive, to the extent to which they operate.
Source: CivC 1877, § 855; CL 1887, § 3479; RCivC 1903, § 1173; RC 1919, § 780; SDC 1939, § 47.0229.
20-6-2. Uncontrollable cause excusing want or delay of performance.
Want of performance, or of an offer of performance, or any delay therein, is excused when it is prevented or delayed by an irresistible superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state, or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.
Source: CivC 1877, § 855, subdiv 2; CL 1887, § 3479, subdiv 2; RCivC 1903, § 1173, subdiv 2; RC 1919, § 780 (2); SDC 1939, § 47.0229 (2).
20-6-3. Want or delay of performance excused by creditor's act inducing nonperformance.
Want of performance, or of an offer of performance, or any delay therein, is excused when the debtor is induced not to make it, by any act of the creditor intended or naturally tending to have that effect, done at or before the time at which such performance or offer may be made, and not rescinded before that time.
Source: CivC 1877, § 855, subdiv 3; CL 1887, § 3479, subdiv 3; RCivC 1903, § 1173, subdiv 3; RC 1919, § 780 (3); SDC 1939, § 47.0229 (3).
20-6-4. Want or delay of performance excused by creditor's act or operation of law preventing performance.
Want of performance, or of an offer of performance, or any delay therein, is excused when such performance or offer is prevented or delayed by the act of the creditor, or by the operation of law, even though there may have been a stipulation that this shall not be an excuse.
Source: CivC 1877, § 855, subdiv 1; CL 1887, § 3479, subdiv 1; RCivC 1903, § 1173, subdiv 1; RC 1919, § 780 (1); SDC 1939, § 47.0229 (1).
20-6-5. Debtor entitled to benefits when performance prevented by creditor.
If the performance of an obligation be prevented by the creditor, the debtor is entitled to all the benefits, which he would have obtained, if it had been performed by both parties.
Source: CivC 1877, § 856; CL 1887, § 3480; RCivC 1903, § 1174; RC 1919, § 781; SDC 1939, § 47.0230.
20-6-6. Debtor entitled to portion of benefits when performance prevented other than by creditor.
If performance of an obligation is prevented by any cause excusing performance, other than the act of the creditor, the debtor is entitled to a ratable proportion of the consideration to which he would have been entitled upon full performance according to the benefit which the creditor receives from the actual performance.
Source: CivC 1877, § 857; CL 1887, § 3481; RCivC 1903, § 1175; RC 1919, § 782; SDC 1939, § 47.0231.
20-6-7. Refusal of performance before offer equivalent to offer and refusal.
A refusal by a creditor to accept performance, made before an offer thereof, is equivalent to an offer and refusal, unless, before performance is actually due, he gives notice to the debtor of his willingness to accept it.
Source: CivC 1877, § 858; CL 1887, § 3482; RCivC 1903, § 1176; RC 1919, § 783; SDC 1939, § 47.0232.
20-7-1
Accord defined.
20-7-2
Execution of accord required to extinguish obligation.
20-7-3
Acceptance of accord as satisfaction--Obligation extinguished.
20-7-4
Obligation extinguished by part performance accepted in writing as satisfaction.
20-7-5
Novation defined.
20-7-6
Novation by substitution of obligation.
20-7-7
Novation by substitution of debtor.
20-7-8
Novation by substitution of creditor.
20-7-9
Rescission of satisfaction by substitution of debtor.
20-7-10
Obligation extinguished by release on new consideration or in writing.
20-7-11
Unknown claims not released by general release.
20-7-12
Joint debtors not released by release of one--Right of contribution.
20-7-1. Accord defined.
An accord is an agreement to accept, in extinction of an obligation, something different from that to which the person agreeing to accept is entitled.
Source: CivC 1877, § 859; CL 1887, § 3483; RCivC 1903, § 1177; RC 1919, § 784; SDC 1939, § 47.0233.
20-7-2. Execution of accord required to extinguish obligation.
Though the parties to an accord are bound to execute it, yet it does not extinguish the obligation until it is fully executed.
Source: CivC 1877, § 860; CL 1887, § 3484; RCivC 1903, § 1178; RC 1919, § 785; SDC 1939, § 47.0234.
20-7-3. Acceptance of accord as satisfaction--Obligation extinguished.
Acceptance by the creditor, of the consideration of an accord, extinguishes the obligation and is called satisfaction.
Source: CivC 1877, § 861; CL 1887, § 3485; RCivC 1903, § 1179; RC 1919, § 786; SDC 1939, § 47.0235.
20-7-4. Obligation extinguished by part performance accepted in writing as satisfaction.
Part performance of an obligation, either before or after a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writing in satisfaction, or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in writing for that purpose, though without any new consideration, extinguishes the obligation.
Source: CivC 1877, § 862; CL 1887, § 3486; RCivC 1903, § 1180; RC 1919, § 787; SDC 1939, § 47.0236.
20-7-5. Novation defined.
Novation is the substitution by contract of a new obligation for an existing one and is subject to the rules concerning contracts in general.
Source: CivC 1877, §§ 863, 865; CL 1887, §§ 3487, 3489; RCivC 1903, §§ 1181, 1183; RC 1919, §§ 788, 790; SDC 1939, § 47.0237.
20-7-6. Novation by substitution of obligation.
Novation is made by the substitution of a new obligation between the same parties, with intent to extinguish the old obligation.
Source: CivC 1877, § 864, subdiv 1; CL 1887, § 3488, subdiv 1; RCivC 1903, § 1182, subdiv 1; RC 1919, § 789 (1); SDC 1939, § 47.0238 (1).
20-7-7. Novation by substitution of debtor.
Novation is made by the substitution of a new debtor in place of the old one, with intent to release the latter.
Source: CivC 1877, § 864, subdiv 2; CL 1887, § 3488, subdiv 2; RCivC 1903, § 1182, subdiv 2; RC 1919, § 789 (2); SDC 1939, § 47.0238 (2).
20-7-8. Novation by substitution of creditor.
Novation is made by the substitution of a new creditor in place of the old one, with intent to transfer the rights of the latter to the former.
Source: CivC 1877, § 864, subdiv 3; CL 1887, § 3488, subdiv 3; RCivC 1903, § 1182, subdiv 3; RC 1919, § 789 (3); SDC 1939, § 47.0238 (3).
20-7-9. Rescission of satisfaction by substitution of debtor.
When the obligation of a third person on an order upon such person is accepted in satisfaction, the creditor may rescind such acceptance if the debtor prevents such person from complying with the order, or from fulfilling the obligation; or if, at the time the obligation or order is received, such person is insolvent, and this fact is unknown to the creditor; or if, before the creditor can with reasonable diligence present the order to the person upon whom it is given, he becomes insolvent.
Source: CivC 1877, § 866; CL 1887, § 3490; RCivC 1903, § 1184; RC 1919, § 791; SDC 1939, § 47.0239.
20-7-10. Obligation extinguished by release on new consideration or in writing.
An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new consideration, or in writing, with or without new consideration.
Source: CivC 1877, § 867; CL 1887, § 3491; RCivC 1903, § 1185; RC 1919, § 792; SDC 1939, § 47.0240.
20-7-11. Unknown claims not released by general release.
A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor.
Source: CivC 1877, § 868; CL 1887, § 3492; RCivC 1903, § 1186; RC 1919, § 793; SDC 1939, § 47.0241.
20-7-12. Joint debtors not released by release of one--Right of contribution.
A release of one of two or more joint debtors does not extinguish the obligations of any of the others, unless they are mere guarantors; nor does it affect their right to contribution from him.
Source: CivC 1877, § 869; CL 1887, § 3493; RCivC 1903, § 1187; RC 1919, § 794; SDC 1939, § 47.0242.
20-8-1
Obligation to restore thing obtained without consent or by unlawful exaction.
20-8-2
Demand not required for obligation to restore--Notice of mutual mistake required.
20-8-1. Obligation to restore thing obtained without consent or by unlawful exaction.
One who obtains a thing without the consent of its owner, or by a consent afterwards rescinded, or by an unlawful exaction which the owner could not at the time prudently refuse, must restore it to the person from whom it was thus obtained, unless he has acquired a title thereto superior to that of such other person, or unless the transaction was corrupt and unlawful on both sides.
Source: CivC 1877, § 977; CL 1887, § 3601; RCivC 1903, § 1295; RC 1919, § 799; SDC 1939, § 47.0305.
20-8-2. Demand not required for obligation to restore--Notice of mutual mistake required.
The restoration required by § 20-8-1 must be made without demand except where a thing is obtained by mutual mistake, in which case the party obtaining the thing is not bound to return it until he has notice of the mistake.
Source: CivC 1877, § 978; CL 1887, § 3602; RCivC 1903, § 1296; RC 1919, § 800; SDC 1939, § 47.0306.
CHAPTER 20-9
LIABILITY FOR TORTS
20-9-1 Responsibility for injury by willful act or negligence--Contributory negligence.
20-9-1.1 Loss of chance doctrine abrogated.
20-9-1.2 Other rules and principles not affected.
20-9-2 Comparative negligence--Reduction of damages.
20-9-3 Licensed medical practitioners immune from liability for emergency care.
20-9-4 Immunity of medical practitioner licensed in another state--Acts not deemed professional practice.
20-9-4.1 Immunity from liability for emergency care--Exception.
20-9-4.2 Physician treating minor without consent of parent or guardian--Immunity from liability--Treatments excepted.
20-9-4.3 Definition of terms.
20-9-4.4 Civil immunity for emergency use or nonuse of AED.
20-9-4.5 20-9-4.5. Repealed by SL 2007, ch 139, § 3.
20-9-4.6 AED trainer immunity.
20-9-4.7 20-9-4.7. Repealed by SL 2007, ch 139, § 4.
20-9-4.8 Immunity inapplicable in event of negligence or misconduct.
20-9-4.9 Over-the-counter AED--Application of chapter--Immunity from civil liability--Exception.
20-9-5 20-9-5. Repealed by SL 1987, ch 158, § 8
20-9-6 Right to protection from bodily harm, insult, or injury to personal relations.
20-9-6.1 Claim of barratry.
20-9-7 Abduction, enticement and seduction forbidden by rights of personal relation.
20-9-8 Repealed
20-9-9 Product's dealers and sellers immune from strict liability except for manufacturers or those who knew of defect--Other causes of action against seller not limited.
20-9-10 Product's manufacturer, assembler, or seller immune from strict liability for injury caused by certain alterations or modifications.
20-9-10.1 State of the art defense in product liability actions.
20-9-11 Landowners, tenants, and lessees exempt from liability for injuries on flooded land--Exceptions.
20-9-11.1 Trespasser defined.
20-9-11.2 Person with possessory interest in land exempt from liability to trespasser--Exceptions.
20-9-11.3 Person with possessory interest in land liable to trespasser for intentional injury.
20-9-11.4 Person with possessory interest in land liable for injury to or death of young child for certain artificial conditions on land.
20-9-11.5 Person with possessory interest in land liable for injury to or death under certain conditions where trespassers consistently intrude upon limited area.
20-9-11.6 Person with possessory interest in land liable for injury to or death of certain known trespassers.
20-9-12 Definition of terms.
20-9-13 Landowner not obligated to keep land safe for outdoor recreational activity—Exception.
20-9-14 Individual on private land for outdoor recreational activity--Landowner not liable--Exceptions.
20-9-15 Landowner liability for land leased to state or its political subdivisions for outdoor recreation activity.
20-9-16 Landowner liability for gross negligence or injury suffered where consideration charged or law violated.
20-9-16.1 Injury or death resulting from inherent risk of an agritourism activity--Warning notice.
20-9-17 Liability for injury to persons or property or failure to exercise care in use of land for outdoor recreation or agritourism.
20-9-18 Doctrine of attractive nuisance not affected.
20-9-19 Definition of terms as to political subdivisions.
20-9-20 Political subdivisions and employees not obligated to keep land safe for entry or use--Exceptions.
20-9-21 Liability of political subdivision or employees for invitational or permissive use of land.
20-9-22 Limits of political subdivision's liability.
20-9-23 Effect of §§ 20-9-19 to 20-9-23 on attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines.
20-9-24 Definition of terms as to state.
20-9-25 State's duty of care to keep land safe and to warn of dangers on land used for outdoor recreational purposes.
20-9-26 Liability of state, its agencies, and employees for invitational or permissive use of land.
20-9-27 Limits of state's liability.
20-9-28 Effect of §§ 20-9-24 to 20-9-28 on attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines.
20-9-29 Definitions.
20-9-30 Livestock owners--Control by another person.
20-9-31 Livestock--Contract--Facilities.
20-9-32 Civil cause of action for malicious intimidation or harassment--Damages.
20-9-33 Civil liability for counterfeit lien.
20-9-34 Civil liability for harassment by threat of fraudulent legal proceedings or liens.
20-9-35 Civil liability for impersonating a judicial official.
20-9-36 Definitions related to asbestos claims.
20-9-37 Asbestos claim defined.
20-9-38 Successor asbestos-related liabilities defined.
20-9-39 Limitation on cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities.
20-9-40 Limitation where transferor assumed or incurred liabilities of prior transferor.
20-9-41 Total gross assets defined--Determination of fair market value.
20-9-42 Adjustment of fair market value of total gross assets.
20-9-43 Exclusions from limitation on cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities.
20-9-44 Limitation of action for personal injury or death caused by negligence of directors and officers of nonprofit fire, ambulance, or search and rescue entity or its employees and volunteers.
20-9-45 Immunity from liability for nonprofit fire, ambulance, or search and rescue entity and its volunteer officers and directors.
20-9-46 Wrongful human trafficking.
20-9-47 Definitions pertaining to fishing tournaments.
20-9-48 Limited liability of fishing tournament sponsors.
20-9-49 Circumstances under which liability of fishing tournament sponsor and others not limited.
20-9-50 Fishing professionals and tournament sponsors liable for warranty and trespass.
20-9-51 Warning sign to be posted by fishing professionals and tournament sponsors--Warning notice in contracts.
20-9-52 Intentional exposure to HIV, syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, or other communicable disease.
20-9-53 Definitions.
20-9-54 Liability for riot and incitement to riot.
20-9-55 Jurisdiction--Evidence--Procedure.
20-9-56 Damages for riot or incitement to riot.
20-9-57 Riot boosting recovery fund established.
20-9-1. Responsibility for injury by willful act or negligence--Contributory negligence.
Every person is responsible for injury to the person, property, or rights of another caused by his willful acts or caused by his want of ordinary care or skill, subject in the latter cases to the defense of contributory negligence.
Source: CivC 1877, § 979; CL 1887, § 3603; RCivC 1903, § 1297; RC 1919, § 801; SDC 1939, § 47.0304.
20-9-1.1. Loss of chance doctrine abrogated.
The Legislature finds that in those actions founded upon an alleged want of ordinary care or skill the conduct of the responsible party must be shown to have been the proximate cause of the injury complained of. The Legislature also finds that the application of the so called loss of chance doctrine in such cases improperly alters or eliminates the requirement of proximate causation. Therefore, the rule in Jorgenson v. Vener, 2000 SD 87, 616 N.W. 2d 366 (2000) is hereby abrogated.
Source: SL 2002, ch 96, § 1.
20-9-1.2. Other rules and principles not affected.
The Legislature intends only to abrogate the loss of chance doctrine expressly adopted by the court, thereby returning the common law of this state to its status immediately prior to the court's decision. The Legislature does not intend to affect any other rule or principle of statutory or common law, including but not limited to, aggravation of preexisting injuries, proximate causation, and the requirement of informed consent for all medical treatment.
Source: SL 2002, ch 96, § 2.
20-9-2. Comparative negligence--Reduction of damages.
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to that person's property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence does not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in such case, the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Notwithstanding Woods vs. City of Crooks, 559 N.W.2d 558 (SD 1997), the determination of whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant shall be made without disclosing any determination of percentage of plaintiff's fault by special interrogatory.
Source: SL 1941, ch 160; SDC Supp 1960, § 47.0304-1; SL 1964, ch 149; SL 1998, ch 125, § 1.
20-9-3. Licensed medical practitioners immune from liability for emergency care.
No physician, surgeon, osteopath, physician assistant, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse, licensed under the provisions of chapters 36-4, 36-4A, and 36-9, who in good faith renders, in this state, emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person rendering the emergency care.
Source: SL 1961, ch 137, § 1; SL 1963, ch 159, § 1; SL 1976, ch 152.
20-9-4. Immunity of medical practitioner licensed in another state--Acts not deemed professional practice.
No physician, surgeon, osteopath, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse duly licensed to practice his profession in another state of the United States, who renders in this state emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable as specified in § 20-9-3, nor shall he be deemed to be practicing medicine or nursing within this state as contemplated by chapters 36-2, 36-4, and 36-9.
Source: SL 1961, ch 137, § 2; SL 1963, ch 159, § 2.
20-9-4.1. Immunity from liability for emergency care--Exception.
No peace officer, conservation officer, member of any fire department, police department and their first aid, rescue or emergency squad, or any citizen acting as such as a volunteer, or any other person is liable for any civil damages as a result of their acts of commission or omission arising out of and in the course of their rendering in good faith, any emergency care and services during an emergency which is in their judgment indicated and necessary at the time. Such relief from liability for civil damages extends to the operation of any motor vehicle in connection with any such care or services.
Nothing in this section grants any relief to any person causing any damage by his willful, wanton or reckless act of commission or omission.
Source: SL 1968, ch 193; SL 1970, ch 140; SL 1986, ch 4, § 9; SL 2013, ch 103, § 1.
20-9-4.2. Physician treating minor without consent of parent or guardian--Immunity from liability--Treatments excepted.
A minor as defined in § 26-1-1 may be treated by a licensed physician before the minor's parent's or guardian's consent is obtained if a parent or guardian is not immediately available and if, in the opinion of the treating physician, exercising competent medical judgment, the attempt to secure the consent would result in delay of treatment which would threaten the minor's life or health.
No physician, hospital, or other person assisting in the treatment of a minor may be held liable for providing medical or surgical treatment for a minor without consent of the minor's parent or guardian, if in the opinion of the treating physician, exercising competent medical judgment, the minor's life or health would be threatened by delaying treatment.
This section does not apply to an elective abortion or to sterilization or to any device or medication for the control of birth, nor shall it be construed to constitute a modification or repeal of any other current provision of law pertaining thereto.
Source: SL 1983, ch 208, §§ 1, 2.
20-9-4.3. Definition of terms.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-4.3 to 20-9-4.8, inclusive, mean:
(1) "AED," an automated external defibrillator;
(2) "Person," a natural person, organization, corporation, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, association, government entity, or any other legal or commercial entity.
Source: SL 2000, ch 93, § 1; SL 2007, ch 139, § 1.
20-9-4.4. Civil immunity for emergency use or nonuse of AED.
Any person, who in good faith obtains, uses, attempts to use, or chooses not to use an AED in providing emergency care or treatment, is immune from civil liability for any injury as a result of such emergency care or treatment or as a result of an act or failure to act in providing or arranging such medical treatment.
Source: SL 2000, ch 93, § 2; SL 2007, ch 139, § 2.
20-9-4.6. AED trainer immunity.
Any person who provides AED training is immune from civil liability for any personal injury that occurs as a result of emergency care or treatment rendered using the AED or as a result of an act or failure to act in providing or arranging such medical treatment.
Source: SL 2000, ch 93, § 4.
20-9-4.8. Immunity inapplicable in event of negligence or misconduct.
The immunity from civil liability under §§ 20-9-4.3 to 20-9-4.8, inclusive, does not apply if the personal injury results from the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering such emergency care.
Source: SL 2000, ch 93, § 6.
20-9-4.9. Over-the-counter AED--Application of chapter--Immunity from civil liability--Exception.
The provisions of this chapter do not apply to an over-the-counter AED purchased without a written prescription. However, any person, who in good faith obtains an over-the-counter AED for use in providing emergency care or treatment or utilizes an over-the-counter AED, is immune from civil liability for any injury as a result of such emergency care or treatment or as a result of an act or failure to act in providing or arranging such emergency care or treatment. The immunity from civil liability pursuant to this section does not apply if the personal injury results from the gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering such emergency care.
Source: SL 2005, ch 118, § 1.
20-9-6. Right to protection from bodily harm, insult, or injury to personal relations.
Every person has, subject to the limitations provided by law, the right of protection from bodily harm or restraint, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations, and every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring any such rights of others and to abstain from injuring the person or property of another.
Source: CivC 1877, §§ 27, 973; CL 1887, §§ 2526, 3597; RCivC 1903, §§ 27, 1291; RC 1919, §§ 93, 795; SDC 1939, § 47.0301.
20-9-6.1. Claim of barratry.
Barratry is the assertion of a frivolous or malicious claim or defense or the filing of any document with malice or in bad faith by a party in a civil action. Barratry constitutes a cause of action which may be asserted by filing a pleading in the same civil action in which the claim of barratry arises or in a subsequent action. A claim of barratry shall be determined in the same manner as any other substantive cause of action asserted in that civil action.
Source: SL 1997, ch 111, § 1; SL 2001, ch 104, § 1.
20-9-7. Abduction, enticement and seduction forbidden by rights of personal relation.
The rights of personal relation forbid:
(1) The abduction or enticement of a husband from his wife or of a parent from a child;
(2) The abduction or enticement of a wife from her husband, of a child from a parent, or from a guardian entitled to its custody;
(3) The seduction of a wife, daughter, or orphan sister;
(4) The seduction of a husband, son, or orphan brother.
Source: SDC 1939, § 47.0302; SL 2002, ch 97, § 1.
20-9-8. Repealed.
Source: CivC 1877, § 33; CL 1887, § 2532; RCivC 1903, § 33; RC 1919, § 101; SDC 1939, § 47.0303; SL 2021, ch 93, § 12.
20-9-9. Product's dealers and sellers immune from strict liability except for manufacturers or those who knew of defect--Other causes of action against seller not limited.
No cause of action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort may be asserted or maintained against any distributor, wholesaler, dealer, or retail seller of a product which is alleged to contain or possess a latent defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the buyer, user, or consumer unless said distributor, wholesaler, dealer, or retail seller is also the manufacturer or assembler of said product or the maker of a component part of the final product, or unless said dealer, wholesaler, or retail seller knew, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known, of the defective condition of the final product. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any other cause of action from being brought against any seller of a product.
Source: SL 1979, ch 155, § 2.
20-9-10. Product's manufacturer, assembler, or seller immune from strict liability for injury caused by certain alterations or modifications.
No manufacturer, assembler, or seller of a product may be held liable for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage sustained by reason of the doctrine of strict liability in tort based on a defect in a product, or failure to warn or protect against a danger or hazard in the use or misuse of such a product, or failure to properly instruct in the use or misuse of such product, where a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage was an alteration or modification of such product made under all of the following circumstances:
(1) The alteration or modification was made subsequent to the manufacture, assembly, or sale of the product;
(2) The alteration or modification altered or modified the purpose, use, function, design, or manner of use of the product from that originally designed, tested, or intended by the manufacturer, assembler, or seller; and
(3) It was not foreseeable by the manufacturer, assembler, or seller of the product that the alteration or modification would be made, and, if made, that it would render the product unsafe.
Source: SL 1979, ch 155, § 1.
20-9-10.1. State of the art defense in product liability actions.
In any product liability action based upon negligence or strict liability, whether the design, manufacture, inspection, testing, packaging, warning, or labeling was in conformity with the generally recognized and prevailing state of the art existing at the time the specific product involved was first sold to any person not engaged in the business of selling such a product, may be considered in determining the standard of care, whether the standard of care was breached or whether the product was in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous to the user.
Source: SL 1995, ch 117.
20-9-11. Landowners, tenants, and lessees exempt from liability for injuries on flooded land--Exceptions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 20-9-16(1), no cause of action may arise against the owner, tenant, or lessee of any real estate for any injury to any person or death resulting therefrom or damage to property of such person when such person is on the flooded lands of the owner, tenant, or lessee, with or without permission, unless such death or injuries were caused by the willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant or lessee.
This section does not affect the doctrine of attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines relating to the liability arising from artificial conditions highly dangerous to children. This section does not preempt the standard of liability which a landowner owes to a person who has paid a charge to enter the land pursuant to subdivision 20-9-16(2).
Source: SL 1987, ch 159; SL 2001, ch 105, § 1.
20-9-11.1. Trespasser defined.
For the purposes of §§ 20-9-11.2 to 20-9-11.6, inclusive, a trespasser is any person who enters on the property of another without permission and without an invitation, express or implied.
Source: SL 2011, ch 111, § 6.
20-9-11.2. Person with possessory interest in land exempt from liability to trespasser--Exceptions.
No person with a possessory interest in land, including an owner, lessee, or other occupant, owes any duty of care to a trespasser nor is subject to liability for any injury to a trespasser except as provided in §§ 20-9-11.3 to 20-9-11.6, inclusive.
Source: SL 2011, ch 111, § 1.
20-9-11.3. Person with possessory interest in land liable to trespasser for intentional injury.
A person with a possessory interest in land may be subject to liability if the trespasser's physical injury or death was intentionally caused, including by entrapment, and if the injury or death was not justifiable pursuant to § 22-18-4.
Source: SL 2011, ch 111, § 2.
20-9-11.4. Person with possessory interest in land liable for injury to or death of young child for certain artificial conditions on land.
A person with a possessory interest in land may be subject to liability for physical injury or death to a child thirteen years of age or younger resulting from an artificial condition on the land if:
(1) The person knew or had reason to know that children of that age were likely to trespass at the location of the artificial condition; and
(2) The condition is one the person knew or reasonably should have known involved an unreasonable risk or death or serious bodily harm to such children; and
(3) The injured child did not discover the artificial condition or realize the risk involved in the artificial condition or the risk coming within the area made dangerous by it; and
(4) The utility to the person of maintaining the artificial condition and the burden of eliminating the danger were slight as compared with the risk to the child involved; and
(5) The person failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the injured child.
Source: SL 2011, ch 111, § 3.
20-9-11.5. Person with possessory interest in land liable for injury to or death under certain conditions where trespassers consistently intrude upon limited area.
A person with a possessory interest in land may be subject to liability for physical injury or death to a trespasser if the possessor knows, or from facts within the possessor's knowledge should have known, that trespassers consistently intrude upon a limited area of the possessor's land and:
(1) The trespasser's harm was caused by the possessor's failure to carry on an activity involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm with reasonable care for the trespasser's safety; or
(2) The trespasser's harm was cause by an artificial condition and:
(a) The artificial condition was created or maintained by the person;
(b) The person knew the artificial condition was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury to such a trespasser;
(c) The artificial condition was of such a nature that the possessor had reason to believe that the trespasser would not discover it; and
(d) The person failed to exercise reasonable care to warn the trespasser of the artificial condition and the risk involved.
Source: SL 2011, ch 111, § 4.
20-9-11.6. Person with possessory interest in land liable for injury to or death of certain known trespassers.
A person with a possessory interest in land may be subject to liability for physical injury or death to a known trespasser if:
(1) The trespasser was harmed as a result of the person's failure to carry on dangerous activities on the land with reasonable care for the trespasser's safety;
(2) The trespasser was harmed as a result of the possessor's failure to exercise reasonable care to warn the trespasser about an artificial condition maintained by the person, the artificial condition involved a risk of death or serious bodily injury, and the artificial condition was of such a nature that the person had reason to believe the trespasser would not discover the artificial condition or realize the risk involved; or
(3) The person knew or had reason to know that the trespasser was in dangerous proximity to a moving force in the person's immediate control just before the harm occurred, and the trespasser was harmed as a result of the person's failure to exercise reasonable care so as to prevent the force from harming the trespasser or failed to exercise reasonable care to provide a warning that was reasonably adequate to allow the trespasser to avoid the harm.
Source: SL 2011, ch 111, § 5.
20-9-12. Definition of terms.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-12 to 20-9-18, inclusive, mean:
(1) "Agritourism activity," any activity carried out on a farm, on a ranch, or in a forest that allows members of the public, for recreation, entertainment, or education purposes, to view or participate in agricultural activities, including farming, ranching, historical, cultural, harvest-your-own, or nature-based activities and attractions. An activity is not an agritourism activity if the participant is paid to participate in the activity;
(2) "Charge," the admission price or fee asked in return for an invitation or permission to enter on or use the land. Any nonmonetary gift to an owner that is less than one hundred dollars in value may not be construed to be a charge;
(3) "Inherent risk," the conditions, dangers, or hazards that are an integral part of the land used for agricultural purposes, including:
(a) Surface and subsurface conditions and natural conditions of land, vegetation, and waters;
(b) The behavior of wild and domestic animals;
(c) The ordinary dangers of structures or equipment ordinarily used in farming or ranching operations, if the structures or equipment are used for farming or ranching purposes;
(d) The potential of a participant in an agritourism activity to act in a negligent way that may contribute to an injury to the participant or others, whether by failing to follow safety procedures or by failing to act with reasonable caution while engaging in the agritourism activity;
(4) "Land," land, trails, water, watercourses, private ways, and structures, and machinery or equipment if attached to the realty;
(5) "Outdoor recreational activity," includes any of the following activities, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming other than in a swimming pool, boating, canoeing, camping, picnicking, hiking, biking, off-road driving, aviation activity, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, snowmobiling, or viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites, or an agritourism activity;
(6) "Owner," the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of the land;
(7) "Participant," an individual who, for purposes of outdoor recreational activity, enters on or uses the land of another but does not include an owner of the land or an agent, employee, or contractor of an owner of the land.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 1; SL 1990, ch 154; SL 2010, ch 109, § 1; SL 2012, ch 117, § 1; SL 2022, ch 57, § 1.
20-9-13. Landowner not obligated to keep land safe for outdoor recreational activity—Exception.
Except as provided in § 20-9-16, an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the land safe for entry on or use by any participant for outdoor recreational activity, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on the owner's land to any participant entering on or using the land for outdoor recreational activity.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 2; SL 2010, ch 109, § 2; SL 2022, ch 57, § 2.
20-9-14. Individual on private land for outdoor recreational activity--Landowner not liable--Exceptions.
Except as provided in § 20-9-16, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any participant to enter on or use the owner's land for outdoor recreational activity, or an owner upon whose land an individual has entered pursuant to § 41-9-8, does not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the land is safe for any purpose;
(2) Confer upon any person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or
(3) Assume responsibility for, or incur liability for, any injury to persons or property caused by an act of omission of the owner as to the maintenance of the land.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 3; SL 1990, ch 155; SL 1991, ch 24, § 6; SL 2010, ch 109, § 3; SL 2022, ch 57, § 3.
20-9-15. Landowner liability for land leased to state or its political subdivisions for outdoor recreation activity.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of §§ 20-9-13 and 20-9-14 apply to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any political subdivision of the state for outdoor recreational activity.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 4; SL 2010, ch 109, § 4; SL 2022, ch 57, § 4.
20-9-16. Landowner liability for gross negligence or injury suffered where consideration charged or law violated.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-12 to 20-9-18, inclusive, limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:
(1) For gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the owner;
(2) For injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges any participant, except as provided in § 20-9-16.1 or except in the case of land leased to the state or a political subdivision of the state, any consideration received by the owner for the lease may not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section nor may any incentive payment paid to the owner by the state or federal government to promote public access for outdoor recreational activities be considered a charge; or
(3) For injury suffered in any case where the owner has violated a county or municipal ordinance or state law which violation is a proximate cause of the injury.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 5; SL 2010, ch 109, § 5; SL 2022, ch 57, § 5.
20-9-16.1. Injury or death resulting from inherent risk of an agritourism activity--Warning notice.
The provisions of subdivision 20-9-16(2) do not apply to injury to an individual or property resulting from inherent risk of an agritourism activity if the owner charges a participant for entry on or use of the land for the agritourism activity and the owner:
(1) Posts and maintains signage containing the warning, described in this section, in a clearly visible and conspicuous location at or near the entrance to the land used for the agritourism activity; and
(2) Includes the warning, described in this section, in a written contract between the owner and any participant who is charged to enter on or use the land for the agritourism activity.
The warning shall include the following: WARNING-Under South Dakota law, an owner of property, including lands and waters, who charges individuals an admission price or fee to participate in an agritourism activity on the owner's property, is not liable for injury to or death of a participant in the agritourism activity or damage to the participant’s property of the injury or damage resulted from an inherent risk of the agritourism activity. Inherent risks are conditions, dangers, or hazards that are an integral part of the land used for agritourism activity, including surface and subsurface conditions and natural conditions of the land, vegetation, and waters; the behavior of wild or domestic animals; the ordinary dangers of structures or equipment ordinarily used in farming or ranching operations when such structures or equipment are used for farming or ranching purposes; and the potential for you or another participant to act in a negligent way that may contribute to your injury, death or damages. You are assuming the risk of participating in the agritourism activity for which you are entering on or using the owner’s land.
Source: SL 2022, ch 57, § 7.
20-9-17. Liability for injury to persons or property or failure to exercise care in use of land for outdoor recreation or agritourism.
Sections 20-9-12 to 20-9-18, inclusive, may not be construed to create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to persons or property, or relieve any person entering on or using the land of another for outdoor recreational activity from any obligation which the person may have in the absence of §§ 20-9-12 to 20-9-18, inclusive, to exercise care in the person's entry on or use of the land, or from the legal consequences of failure to employ such care.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 6; SL 2010, ch 109, § 6; SL 2022, ch 57, § 6.
20-9-18. Doctrine of attractive nuisance not affected.
Sections 20-9-12 to 20-9-18, inclusive, does not affect the doctrine of attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines relating to liability arising from artificial conditions highly dangerous to children.
Source: SL 1987, ch 158, § 7.
20-9-19. Definition of terms as to political subdivisions.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-19 to 20-9-23, inclusive, mean:
(1) "Land," all land, trails, water, watercourses, lakes, ponds, reservoirs, or improvements to real property, except for machinery and equipment on or attached to the realty, when located on lands owned, leased, or managed by any political subdivision of South Dakota, all areas designated as snowmobile, equestrian, hiking, or other recreational trails by any political subdivision of South Dakota, all private lands leased by any political subdivision of South Dakota, for public hunting, and all lands owned, leased, or operated by any political subdivision of South Dakota and operated as a park; and
(2) "Outdoor recreational purpose," includes any of the following activities or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming other than in a swimming pool, boating, canoeing, kayaking, camping, picnicking, hiking, biking, skateboarding, in-line skating, sledding, horseback riding, off-road driving, nature study, water skiing, team sports, snowmobiling, skiing, climbing, spelunking, para-sailing, hang gliding, shooting, observing wildlife, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites, or engaging in any other form of outdoor sport or recreational activity of any sort.
Source: SL 1996, ch 147, § 1; SL 1999, ch 111, § 1.
20-9-20. Political subdivisions and employees not obligated to keep land safe for entry or use--Exceptions.
Except as provided in § 20-9-22, any political subdivision of South Dakota, and its employees acting within the scope of their duties owe no duty of care to keep the land safe for entry or use by others for outdoor recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on the land to persons entering the land for outdoor recreational purposes.
Source: SL 1996, ch 147, § 2.
20-9-21. Liability of political subdivision or employees for invitational or permissive use of land.
Except as provided in § 20-9-22, any political subdivision of South Dakota, and its employees, by either directly or indirectly inviting or permitting the person to use the land described for outdoor recreational purposes or by charging a fee for admittance to parks, campgrounds, or other recreational areas, do not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the land is safe for any purpose; or
(2) Confer upon any person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or
(3) Assume responsibility for, or incur liability for, any injury to persons or property caused by an act of omission of the political subdivision of South Dakota, and its employees as to maintenance of the land.
Source: SL 1996, ch 147, § 3.
20-9-22. Limits of political subdivision's liability.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-19 to 20-9-23, inclusive, limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:
(1) For gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the political subdivision of South Dakota, or its employees; and
(2) For injury suffered in any case where the political subdivision of South Dakota, or its employees, have violated a county or municipal ordinance or state law which violation is a proximate cause of the injury.
Source: SL 1996, ch 147, § 4.
20-9-23. Effect of §§ 20-9-19 to 20-9-23 on attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-19 to 20-9-23, inclusive, affects the doctrine of attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines relating to liability arising from artificial conditions unreasonably dangerous to children.
Source: SL 1996, ch 147, § 5.
20-9-24. Definition of terms as to state.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-24 to 20-9-28 mean:
(1) "Land," all land, trails, water, watercourses, lakes, ponds, reservoirs, or improvements to real property, except for machinery and equipment on or attached to the realty, when located on lands owned, leased, or managed by the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish and Parks, all areas designated as snowmobile, equestrian, hiking, or other recreational trails by the State of South Dakota, and all private lands leased by the State of South Dakota for public hunting; and
(2) "Outdoor recreational purpose," includes any of the following activities or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming other than in a swimming pool, boating, canoeing, kayaking, camping, picnicking, hiking, biking, horseback riding, off-road driving, nature study, water skiing, team sports, snowmobiling, skiing, climbing, spelunking, para-sailing, hang gliding, shooting, observing wildlife, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites, or engaging in any other form of outdoor sport or recreational activity of any sort.
Source: SL 1996, ch 148, § 1.
20-9-25. State's duty of care to keep land safe and to warn of dangers on land used for outdoor recreational purposes.
Except as provided in § 20-9-27, the State of South Dakota, its agencies, and its employees acting within the scope of their duties owe no duty of care to keep the land safe for entry or use by others for outdoor recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on the land to persons entering the land for outdoor recreational purposes.
Source: SL 1996, ch 148, § 2.
20-9-26. Liability of state, its agencies, and employees for invitational or permissive use of land.
Except as provided in § 20-9-27, the State of South Dakota, its agencies, and employees, by either directly or indirectly inviting or permitting the person to use the land described for outdoor recreational purposes or by charging a fee for admittance to parks, campgrounds, or other recreational areas, do not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the land is safe for any purpose; or
(2) Confer upon any person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or
(3) Assume responsibility for, or incur liability for, any injury to persons or property caused by an act of omission of the State of South Dakota, its agencies and employees as to maintenance of the land.
Source: SL 1996, ch 148, § 3.
20-9-27. Limits of state's liability.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-24 to 20-9-28, inclusive, limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:
(1) For gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the State of South Dakota, its agencies or employees; and
(2) For injury suffered in any case where the State of South Dakota, its agencies or employees, have violated a county or municipal ordinance or state law which violation is a proximate cause of the injury.
Source: SL 1996, ch 148, § 4.
20-9-28. Effect of §§ 20-9-24 to 20-9-28 on attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-24 to 20-9-28, inclusive, affects the doctrine of attractive nuisance or other legal doctrines relating to liability arising from artificial conditions unreasonably dangerous to children.
Source: SL 1996, ch 148, § 5.
20-9-29. Definitions.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-29 to 20-9-31, inclusive, mean:
(1) "Person," any corporation, family farm corporation, limited liability corporation, cooperative association, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, joint venture, natural person, or other legally established entity of any sort;
(2) "Livestock," includes cattle, poultry, bison, sheep, swine, goats, and horses;
(3) "Ownership interest," includes any partial, fractional, or complete ownership of an interest in livestock, but does not include any lien or security interest attaching to livestock;
(4) "Environmental damages," includes all damages arising from contamination or pollution of air, water, real or personal property, livestock, wild animals, birds, fish, or other aquatic life, or injury to human beings from a location within the State of South Dakota, including contamination or pollution, as defined in Title 34A.
Source: SL 1998, ch 123, § 1; SDCL 34A-11-9.1
20-9-30. Livestock owners--Control by another person.
Any person who holds an ownership interest in livestock and negligently entrusts the possession or control of that livestock to another person shall be jointly and severally liable for all environmental damages which are caused by the acts or omissions of the person entrusted with those livestock and which arise from the possession or control of that livestock.
Source: SL 1998, ch 123, § 2; SDCL § 34A-11-9.2
20-9-31. Livestock--Contract--Facilities.
Any person who holds an ownership interest in livestock and controls or specifies through a contract or other business relationship the design, construction, or operational instructions of the facilities which care for that livestock shall be jointly and severally liable for all environmental damages which are caused by such person's negligent design, negligent construction, or negligent operational instructions for the livestock facility.
Source: SL 1998, ch 123, § 3; SDCL 34A-11-9.3
20-9-32. Civil cause of action for malicious intimidation or harassment--Damages.
In addition to the criminal penalty provided in § 22-19B-1, there is a civil cause of action for malicious harassment. The victim of malicious intimidation or harassment may recover both special and general damages, including damages for emotional distress, reasonable attorney fees and costs, and punitive damages. The civil cause of action for malicious intimidation or harassment is in addition to any other remedies, criminal or civil, otherwise available under law.
Source: SL 1993, ch 177, § 3; SDCL, 22-19B-3; SL 2005, ch 120, §§ 183, 185.
20-9-33. Civil liability for counterfeit lien.
Any person who violates § 22-11-28 is liable in a civil action to any person for any injury, death, or loss to person or property incurred as a result of the commission of the offense and for reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses incurred as a result of prosecuting a civil action commenced under this section. A civil action under this section is not the exclusive remedy of a person who incurs injury, death, or loss to person or property as a result of a violation of § 22-11-28.
Source: SL 1997, ch 45, § 9; SDCL, § 22-11-30; SL 2005, ch 120, § 232.
20-9-34. Civil liability for harassment by threat of fraudulent legal proceedings or liens.
Any person who violates § 22-11-31 is liable in a civil action to any person for any injury, death, or loss to person or property incurred as a result of the commission of the offense and for reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses incurred as a result of prosecuting a civil action commenced under this section. A civil action under this section is not the exclusive remedy of a person who incurs injury, death, or loss to person or property as a result of a violation of § 22-11-31.
Source: SL 1997, ch 45, § 12; SDCL, § 22-11-33; SL 2005, ch 120, § 232.
20-9-35. Civil liability for impersonating a judicial official.
Any person who violates § 22-40-17 is liable in a civil action to any person for any injury, death, or loss to person or property incurred as a result of the commission of the offense and for reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses incurred as a result of prosecuting a civil action commenced under this section. A civil action under this section is not the exclusive remedy of a person who incurs injury, death, or loss to persons or property as a result of a violation of § 22-40-17.
Source: SL 1997, ch 45, § 14; SDCL § 22-11-35; SL 2005, ch 120, § 232, eff. July 1, 2006.
20-9-36. Definitions related to asbestos claims.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-36 to 20-9-43, inclusive, mean:
(1) "Corporation," any corporation for profit, including a domestic corporation organized under the laws of this state or a foreign corporation organized under laws other than the laws of this state;
(2) "Successor," any corporation that assumes or incurs or has assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities and that became a successor before January 1, 1972, or any successors of that corporation;
(3) "Transferor," any corporation from which successor asbestos-related liabilities are or were assumed or incurred.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 1.
20-9-37. Asbestos claim defined.
For the purposes of §§ 20-9-36 to 20-9-43, inclusive, an asbestos claim is any claim, wherever or whenever made, for damages, losses, indemnification, contribution, or other relief arising out of, based on, or in any way related to asbestos, including:
(1) The health effects of exposure to asbestos, including a claim for personal injury or death, mental or emotional injury, risk of disease or other injury, or the costs of medical monitoring or surveillance;
(2) Any claim made by or on behalf of any person exposed to asbestos, or a representative, spouse, parent, child, or other relative of the person; and
(3) Any claim for damage or loss caused by the installation, presence, or removal of asbestos.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 2.
20-9-38. Successor asbestos-related liabilities defined.
For the purposes of §§ 20-9-36 to 20-9-43, inclusive, successor asbestos-related liabilities are any liabilities, whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, absolute or contingent, accrued or unaccrued, liquidated or unliquidated, or due to become due, which are related to asbestos claims and were assumed or incurred by a corporation as a result of, or in connection with, a merger or consolidation, or the plan of merger or consolidation related to the merger or consolidation with or into another corporation, or that are related in any way to asbestos claims based on the exercise of control or the ownership of stock of the corporation before the merger or consolidation. The term includes liabilities that, after the time of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of total gross assets is determined, pursuant to § 20-9-41, were or are paid or otherwise discharged, or committed to be paid or otherwise discharged, by or on behalf of the corporation, or by a successor of the corporation, or by or on behalf of a transferor, in connection with settlements, judgments, or other discharges in this state or another jurisdiction.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 3.
20-9-39. Limitation on cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities.
The cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities of any successor corporation are limited to the fair market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the merger or consolidation. The successor corporation does not have responsibility for successor asbestos-related liabilities in excess of this limitation.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 4.
20-9-40. Limitation where transferor assumed or incurred liabilities of prior transferor.
If the transferor had assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities or liabilities in connection with a prior merger or consolidation with a prior transferor, then the fair market value of the total assets of the prior transferor determined as of the time of the earlier merger or consolidation shall be substituted for the limitation set forth in § 20-9-39 for purposes of determining the limitation of liability of a successor corporation.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 5.
20-9-41. Total gross assets defined--Determination of fair market value.
Any successor corporation may establish the fair market value of total gross assets for the purpose of the limitations under §§ 20-9-39 and 20-9-40 through any method reasonable under the circumstances, including:
(1) By reference to the going concern value of the assets or to the purchase price attributable to, or paid for, the assets in arms-length transactions; or
(2) In the absence of other readily available information from which the fair market value can be determined, by reference to the value of the assets recorded on a balance sheet.
Total gross assets include intangible assets. To the extent total gross assets include any liability insurance that was issued to the transferor whose assets are being valued for purposes of this section, the applicability, terms, conditions, and limits of such insurance are not affected by this section, nor does this section otherwise affect the rights and obligations of an insurer, transferor, or successor under any insurance contract or any related agreements, including pre-enactment settlements resolving coverage-related disputes, and the rights of an insurer to seek payment for applicable deductibles, retrospective premiums, or self-insured retentions or to seek contribution from a successor for uninsured or self-insured periods or periods where insurance is uncollectible or otherwise unavailable. Without limiting the foregoing, to the extent total gross assets include any such liability insurance, a settlement of a dispute concerning any such liability insurance coverage entered into by a transferor successor with the insurers of the transferor before the date of enactment of §§ 20-9-36 to 20-9-43, inclusive, shall be determinative of the total coverage of such liability insurance to be included in the calculation of the transferor's total gross assets.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 6.
20-9-42. Adjustment of fair market value of total gross assets.
The fair market value of total gross assets at the time of the merger or consolidation shall increase annually at a rate equal to the sum of the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year since the merger or consolidation, unless the prime rate is not published in that edition of the Wall Street Journal, in which case any reasonable determination of the prime rate on the first day of the year may be used, plus one percent. This rate may not be compounded. The adjustment of the fair market value of total gross assets shall continue as provided in this section until the date the adjusted value is first exceeded by the cumulative amounts of successor asbestos-related liabilities paid or committed to be paid by or on behalf of the successor corporation or a predecessor or by or on behalf of a transferor after the time of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of total gross assets is determined.
No adjustment of the fair market value of total gross assets may be applied to any liability insurance that may be included in the definition of total gross assets by § 20-9-41.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 7.
20-9-43. Exclusions from limitation on cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities.
The provisions of §§ 20-9-39 and 20-9-40 do not apply to any of the following:
(1) Workers' compensation benefits paid by or on behalf of an employer to an employee under the provisions of Title 62, or a comparable workers' compensation law of another jurisdiction;
(2) Any claim against a corporation that does not constitute a successor asbestos-related liability;
(3) Any obligation under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. section 151, et seq., or under any collective bargaining agreement; or
(4) A successor that, after a merger or consolidation, continued in the business of mining asbestos or in the business of selling or distributing asbestos fibers or in the business of manufacturing, distributing, removing, or installing asbestos-containing products which were the same or substantially the same as those products previously manufactured, distributed, removed, or installed by the transferor.
Source: SL 2010, ch 110, § 8.
20-9-44. Limitation of action for personal injury or death caused by negligence of directors and officers of nonprofit fire, ambulance, or search and rescue entity or its employees and volunteers.
Any action for recovery of damages for personal injury or death caused by the negligence of directors and officers of a nonprofit fire, ambulance, or search and rescue entity organized or incorporated in the State of South Dakota, or its employees and volunteers authorized by the nonprofit organization at the time of the alleged negligent act shall be commenced within two years from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury or death. This section applies whether such person is classified, unclassified, licensed, certified, permanent, temporary, compensated, or not compensated.
Source: SL 2013, ch 103, § 2.
20-9-45. Immunity from liability for nonprofit fire, ambulance, or search and rescue entity and its volunteer officers and directors.
A nonprofit fire, ambulance, or search and rescue entity organized or incorporated in the State of South Dakota and its volunteer officers and directors are immune from civil liability for any action brought in any court in this state on the basis of any act or omission resulting in damage or injury if:
(1) The individual was acting in good faith and within the scope of such individual's official functions and duties for the nonprofit organization or corporation; and
(2) The damage or injury was not caused by gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct by such individual.
Source: SL 2013, ch 103, § 3.
20-9-46. Wrongful human trafficking.
A victim of human trafficking pursuant to chapter 22-49, or any federal human trafficking offense, may bring a civil cause of action for wrongful human trafficking.
Source: SL 2014, ch 107, § 1.
20-9-47. Definitions pertaining to fishing tournaments.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-47 to 20-9-51, inclusive, mean:
(1) "Fishing," the riding, driving, or being a passenger in a boat or watercraft used in a fishing tournament, or any person assisting a participant or show management. The term does not include being a spectator at a fishing tournament;
(2) "Fishing tournament," an organized competition among fishermen, usually as a series of competition events centered around or on a specific body of water, with specific rules applying to each event;
(3) "Fishing tournament sponsor," any individual, group, club, partnership, or corporation, whether or not the sponsor is operating for profit or nonprofit, that supports, organizes, or provides the facilities for a fishing tournament;
(4) "Fishing professional," any person engaged for compensation in instructing a participant or renting to a participant a boat, watercraft or other equipment for the purpose of fishing in a fishing tournament;
(5) "Inherent risks of fishing," those dangers or conditions that are an integral part of fishing, including:
(a) The unpredictability of the weather and environment in the area the fishing occurs;
(b) Certain hazards such as surface and subsurface conditions of the body of water at or on which the fishing occurs;
(c) Collisions with other boats, watercrafts, vehicles, ice shacks, or objects;
(d) If engaged in a fishing tournament, the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, such as failing to maintain control over the boat or watercraft or not acting within the participant's ability;
(6) "Participant," any person, whether amateur or professional, who engages in a fishing tournament, whether or not a fee is paid to participate in a fishing tournament.
Source: SL 2016, ch 115, § 1.
20-9-48. Limited liability of fishing tournament sponsors.
No fishing tournament sponsor is liable for an injury to, or the death of, a participant resulting from the inherent risks of fishing.
Source: SL 2016, ch 115, § 2.
20-9-49. Circumstances under which liability of fishing tournament sponsor and others not limited.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-47 to 20-9-51, inclusive, prevents or limits the liability of a fishing tournament sponsor, a fishing professional, or any other person if the fishing tournament sponsor, fishing professional, or other person:
(1) Provides the equipment, boat, or watercraft, and knew or should have known that the equipment, boat, or watercraft was faulty, and the equipment, boat, or watercraft was faulty to the extent that it causes the injury; or provides the equipment, boat, or watercraft and fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the proper operating licensure and ability of the participant to engage safely in the fishing tournament and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the equipment, boat, or watercraft based on the participant's representations of the participant's ability;
(2) Owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustains any injury because of a dangerous latent condition that was known to the fishing tournament sponsor, fishing professional, or person and for which warning signs had not been conspicuously posted;
(3) Commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant and that causes the injury; or
(4) Intentionally injures the participant.
Source: SL 2016, ch 115, § 3.
20-9-50. Fishing professionals and tournament sponsors liable for warranty and trespass.
Nothing in §§ 20-9-47 to 20-9-51, inclusive, prevents or limits the liability of any fishing tournament sponsor or fishing professional for any injury involving a participant if the recovery is made pursuant to warranty or trespass.
Source: SL 2016, ch 115, § 4.
20-9-51. Warning sign to be posted by fishing professionals and tournament sponsors--Warning notice in contracts.
Each fishing professional and fishing tournament sponsor shall post and maintain the following sign:
WARNING: Under South Dakota law, no fishing tournament sponsor or fishing professional is liable for an injury to, or the death of, a participant resulting from the inherent risks of fishing, pursuant to §§ 20-9-47 to 20-9-51 of the South Dakota Codified Laws.
The sign shall be placed in a clearly visible location on or near boat docks, registration tables, equipment rental stations, or where a fishing professional conducts fishing activities. The warning notice shall appear on the sign in black letters, with each letter being a minimum of one inch in height. Each written contract entered into by a fishing professional for the providing of professional services, instruction, or the rental of equipment, a boat, or watercraft to a participant, whether or not the contract involves fishing activities on or off the location or site of the fishing professional's business, shall contain in clearly readable print the warning notice provided in this section.
Source: SL 2016, ch 115, § 5.
20-9-52. Intentional exposure to HIV, syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, or other communicable disease.
Any person who knowingly violates the provisions of § 22-18-31, 34-22-5, or 34-23-1 is liable for civil damages.
Source: SL 2018, ch 204, § 2.
20-9-53. Definitions.
Terms used in §§ 20-9-53 to 20-9-57, inclusive, mean:
(1) "Civil recoveries," funds received by the state from any third party as damages resulting from riot or incitement to riot that cause the state or a political subdivision to incur costs;
(2) "Incitement to riot," any person who, with the intent to cause a riot, commits an act or engages in conduct that urges three or more people, acting together and without authority of law, to use force or violence to cause any injury to any person or any damage to property, under circumstances in which the force or violence is imminent and the urging is likely to incite or produce the use of force or violence, incites riot. Urging includes instigating, inciting, or directing, but does not include the oral or written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief that does not urge the commission of an act or conduct of imminent force or violence;
(3) "Person," any individual, joint venture, association, partnership, cooperative, limited liability company, corporation, nonprofit, other entity, or any group acting as a unit;
(4) "Political subdivision," a county or municipality;
(5) "Riot," any intentional use of force or violence by three or more persons, acting together and without authority of law, to cause any injury to any person or any damage to property; and
(6) "Secretary," the secretary of the Department of Public Safety.
Source: SL 2019, ch 104, § 1, eff. Mar. 27, 2019; SL 2020, ch 73, § 1; SL 2020, ch 78, § 5.
20-9-54. Liability for riot and incitement to riot.
In addition to any other liability or criminal penalty under law, a person is personally liable for riot, and jointly and severally liable for riot with any other person engaged in the same riot, to the state or a political subdivision in an action for damages if the person commits riot as defined under § 20-9-53.
In addition to any other liability or criminal penalty under law, a person is personally liable for incitement to riot, and jointly and severally liable for incitement to riot with any other person engaged in the same riot, to the state or a political subdivision in an action for damages if the person commits incitement to riot as defined under § 20-9-53.
Nothing in this section may be construed to include the oral or written advocacy of ideas or expression of belief that does not urge the commission of an act or conduct of imminent force or violence. This section may not be construed to prevent the peaceable assembly of persons for lawful purposes of protest or petition.
Source: SL 2019, ch 104, § 2, eff. Mar. 27, 2019; SL 2020, ch 73, § 2; SL 2020, ch 78, § 6.
20-9-55. Jurisdiction--Evidence--Procedure.
A person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for incitement to riot that results in a riot in this state, regardless of whether the person engages in incitement to riot personally, or through any employee, agent, or subsidiary.
Evidence is not admissible in an action for riot or incitement to riot that shows that any damages, in whole or in part, were paid by a third party. Notwithstanding any other law, any action arising under § 20-9-54 is governed by the procedural and substantive law of this state.
Any action for riot or incitement to riot shall be for the exclusive benefit of the state or political subdivision and shall be brought in the name of the state or political subdivision. The state, a political subdivision, or any third party having an interest in preventing a riot or incitement to riot may enter into an agreement to establish joint representation of a cause of action under § 20-9-54.
Source: SL 2019, ch 104, § 3, eff. Mar. 27, 2019; SL 2020, ch 73, § 3; SL 2020, ch 78, § 7.
20-9-56. Damages for riot or incitement to riot.
The plaintiff in an action for riot or incitement to riot may recover both special and general damages, reasonable attorney's fees, disbursements, other reasonable expenses incurred from prosecuting the action, and punitive damages. A fine paid by a defendant for any violation of chapter 22-10 may not be applied toward payment of damages under this section.
Source: SL 2019, ch 104, § 4, eff. Mar. 27, 2019; SL 2020, ch 73, § 4; SL 2020, ch 78, § 8.
20-9-57. Riot boosting recovery fund established.
There is established in the state treasury the riot boosting recovery fund. Money in the fund may be used to pay any claim for damages arising out of or in connection with a riot or may be transferred to the pipeline engagement activity coordination expenses fund. Interest earned on money in the fund established under this section shall be credited to the fund. The fund is continuously appropriated to the Department of Public Safety, which shall administer the fund. All money received by the department for the fund shall be set forth in an informational budget pursuant to § 4-7-7.2 and be annually reviewed by the Legislature.
The secretary shall approve vouchers and the state auditor shall draw warrants to pay any claim authorized by §§ 20-9-53 to 20-9-57, inclusive.
Any civil recoveries shall be deposited in the fund.
Source: SL 2019, ch 104, § 5, eff. Mar. 27, 2019.
20-10-1
Liability for damage caused by deceit.
20-10-2
Acts constituting deceit.
20-10-3
Fraud against public or class as fraud against individual.
20-10-1. Liability for damage caused by deceit.
One who willfully deceives another, with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.
Source: CivC 1877, § 974; CL 1887, § 3598; RCivC 1903, § 1292; RC 1919, § 796; SDC 1939, § 47.0401.
20-10-2. Acts constituting deceit.
A deceit within the meaning of § 20-10-1 is either:
(1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
(2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
(3) The suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or
(4) A promise made without any intention of performing.
Source: CivC 1877, § 975; CL 1887, § 3599; RCivC 1903, § 1293; RC 1919, § 797; SDC 1939, § 47.0402.
20-10-3. Fraud against public or class as fraud against individual.
One who practices a deceit with intent to defraud the public, or a particular class of persons, is deemed to have intended to defraud every individual in that class, who is actually misled by the deceit.
Source: CivC 1877, § 976; CL 1887, § 3600; RCivC 1903, § 1294; RC 1919, § 798; SDC 1939, § 47.0403.
20-10A-1
Definition of terms.
20-10A-2
Cause of action for damages.
20-10A-3
Liability for damages.
20-10A-4
Limitation on actions for damages.
20-10A-1. Definition of terms.
Terms used in this chapter mean:
(1) "Agricultural food product," any food product of agriculture or aquaculture that is sold or distributed in a form that will perish or decay beyond marketability within a period of time; and
(2) "Disparagement," dissemination in any manner to the public of any information that the disseminator knows to be false and that states or implies that an agricultural food product is not safe for consumption by the public or that generally accepted agricultural and management practices make agricultural food products unsafe for consumption by the public;
(3) "Generally accepted agricultural and management practices," agronomic and animal husbandry procedures used in the production of agricultural goods including tillage options, fertilizers, crop protection practices for crop production, and the feeding, transporting, housing, and health practices for livestock.
Source: SL 1994, ch 159, § 1.
20-10A-2. Cause of action for damages.
Any producer of perishable agricultural food products who suffers damage as a result of another person's disparagement of any such perishable agricultural food product has a cause of action for damages and any other appropriate relief in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Source: SL 1994, ch 159, § 2.
20-10A-3. Liability for damages.
Any person who disparages a perishable agricultural food product with intent to harm the producer is liable to the producer for treble the damages so caused.
Source: SL 1994, ch 159, § 3.
20-10A-4. Limitation on actions for damages.
Any civil action for damages for disparagement of perishable agricultural food products shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.
Source: SL 1994, ch 159, § 4.
20-11-1
Obligation to refrain from defamation.
20-11-2
Classes of defamation.
20-11-3
Libel defined.
20-11-4
Slander defined.
20-11-5
Privileged communications--Malice not inferred from publication.
20-11-6
Radio and television stations not liable if due care exercised.
20-11-7
Retraction notice to newspaper--Punitive damages avoided by retraction--Candidates
for office.
20-11-8
Newspaper retraction as rebuttal of presumption of malice.
20-11-1. Obligation to refrain from defamation.
Every person is obligated to refrain from infringing upon the right of others not to be defamed.
Source: SDC 1939, § 47.0501.
20-11-2. Classes of defamation.
Defamation is effected by:
(1) Libel; or
(2) Slander.
Source: CivC 1877, § 28; CL 1887, § 2527; RCivC 1903, § 28; RC 1919, § 94; SDC 1939, § 47.0502.
20-11-3. Libel defined.
Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.
Source: CivC 1877, § 29; CL 1887, § 2528; RCivC 1903, § 29; RC 1919, § 95; SDC 1939, § 47.0502.
20-11-4. Slander defined.
Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel, which:
(1) Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime;
(2) Imputes to him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease;
(3) Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profit;
(4) Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or
(5) By natural consequence, causes actual damage.
Source: CivC 1877, § 30; CL 1887, § 2529; RCivC 1903, § 30; RC 1919, § 98; SDC 1939, § 47.0502.
20-11-5. Privileged communications--Malice not inferred from publication.
A privileged communication is one made:
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty;
(2) In any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or who is requested by the person interested to give the information;
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding or of anything said in the course thereof.
In the cases provided for in subdivisions (3) and (4) of this section, malice is not inferred from the communication or publication.
Source: CivC 1877, § 31; CL 1887, § 2530; RCivC 1903, § 31; RC 1919, § 99; SDC 1939, § 47.0503.
20-11-6. Radio and television stations not liable if due care exercised.
The owner, licensee, or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee, or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, licensee, or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, operator, or such agent or employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast.
Source: SL 1949, ch 206; SDC Supp 1960, § 47.0506.
20-11-7. Retraction notice to newspaper--Punitive damages avoided by retraction--Candidates for office.
Before any action for libel can be brought against a newspaper or the publisher, editor, or manager thereof, the party aggrieved must at least three days before the commencement of such action serve a notice on the person or persons against whom said action is to be brought specifying particularly the statement or statements claimed to be false and defamatory. If on the trial it appears that such statement or statements were written or published in good faith and with the belief founded upon reasonable grounds that the same were true, and a full and fair retraction of the erroneous matter correcting any and all misstatements of fact therein contained was published in the next issue of the paper, or in the case of a daily paper within three days after the mistake was brought to the attention of the publisher, editor, or manager in as conspicuous type as the original statement and the same position in the paper, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover no punitive damages. But if the libel is against a candidate for office the retraction must also be made editorially in the case of a daily paper at least three days and in the case of a weekly paper at least ten days before the election.
Source: SL 1915, ch 153, § 1; RC 1919, § 96; SDC 1939, § 47.0504; SL 1979, ch 149, § 9.
20-11-8. Newspaper retraction as rebuttal of presumption of malice.
The publication of a full and fair retraction of the alleged defamatory statement as provided by § 20-11-7 shall, on the trial of an action for such libel, be held and considered a rebuttal of any and all presumption of malice attached to and growing out of such alleged libel.
Source: SL 1915, ch 153, § 2; RC 1919, § 97; SDC 1939, § 47.0505.
20-11A-1
Power to contract denied person without understanding--Liabilities for necessaries.
20-11A-2
Contract made before adjudication of incapacity subject to rescission.
20-11A-3
Disability after adjudication of incapacity--Testamentary power on actual restoration
to capacity.
20-11A-4
Liability for torts.
20-11A-5
Restriction on subjection to exemplary damages.
20-11A-1. Power to contract denied person without understanding--Liabilities for necessaries.
A person entirely without understanding has no power to make a contract of any kind, but he is liable for the reasonable value of things furnished to him necessary for his support or the support of his family.
Source: CivC 1877, § 20; CL 1887, § 2519; RCivC 1903, § 20; RC 1919, § 86; SDC 1939, § 30.0801; SDCL, § 27A-2-1.
20-11A-2. Contract made before adjudication of incapacity subject to rescission.
A conveyance or other contract of a person of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding, made before his incapacity has been judicially determined, is subject to rescission as provided in chapter 21-12.
Source: CivC 1877, § 21; CL 1887, § 2520; RCivC 1903, § 21; RC 1919, § 87; SDC 1939, § 30.0802; SDCL, § 27A-2-2.
20-11A-3. Disability after adjudication of incapacity--Testamentary power on actual restoration to capacity.
After his incapacity has been judicially determined, a person of unsound mind can make no conveyance or other contract, nor delegate any power, nor waive any right, until his restoration to capacity is judicially determined. If actually restored to capacity, he may make a will, though his restoration is not thus determined.
Source: CivC 1877, § 22; CL 1887, § 2521; RCivC 1903, § 22; RC 1919, § 88; SDC 1939, § 30.0803; SDCL, § 27A-2-3.
20-11A-4. Liability for torts.
A person of unsound mind, of whatever degree, is civilly liable for a wrong done by him, in like manner as any other person.
Source: CivC 1877, § 23; CL 1887, § 2522; RCivC 1903, § 23; RC 1919, § 89; SDC 1939, § 30.0804; SDCL, § 27A-2-4.
20-11A-5. Restriction on subjection to exemplary damages.
A person of unsound mind cannot be subjected to exemplary damages, unless at the time of the act he was capable of knowing that it was wrongful.
Source: CivC 1877, § 24; CL 1887, § 2523; RCivC 1903, § 24; RC 1919, § 90; SDC 1939, § 30.0805; SDCL § 27A-2-5.
20-12-1 to 20-12-3. Repealed.
20-12-4
Authority of municipality and county to investigate discriminatory practices.
20-12-5
Commissions on human relations authorized--Purposes and powers.
20-12-6
Investigating powers of local commission--Affirmative action--Power
coextensive with powers of state commission.
20-12-6.1
Right to proceed in circuit court or before local commission--Notice as to right
of election.
20-12-7
Appeal from local commission.
20-12-8
Definition of terms.
20-12-9
Transfer of complaints to state commission.
20-12-4. Authority of municipality and county to investigate discriminatory practices.
Any municipality or county may investigate any discriminatory practices based on sex, race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, disability, familial status, or national origin, with respect to employment, labor union membership, housing accommodations, property rights, education, public accommodations, or public services.
Source: SL 1970, ch 66, § 1; SL 1973, ch 140; SL 1975, ch 165, § 2; SL 1986, ch 170, § 1; SL 1991, ch 179, § 1.
20-12-5. Commissions on human relations authorized--Purposes and powers.
To effectuate the foregoing policy municipalities and counties may establish a commission on human relations which may act to disseminate information, to engage in and co-operate with programs of research and education, to co-operate with persons or groups interested in similar objectives, to conduct public meetings and hearings, to mediate and conciliate in instances of alleged discrimination, and to initiate and hear complaints alleging discrimination with such investigation and inquiry as may reasonably appear necessary.
Source: SL 1970, ch 66, § 2; SL 1975, ch 165, § 3.
20-12-6. Investigating powers of local commission--Affirmative action--Power coextensive with powers of state commission.
In the hearing of verified complaints such a commission may subpoena and examine witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and require the production for examination of relevant books or papers and to take such affirmative action as in the judgment of the commission will effectuate its purposes. The powers of the local commission may be coextensive with the powers of the State Human Rights Commission as set forth in § 20-13-42. All hearings under this chapter shall be conducted pursuant to contested case procedures in chapter 1-26.
Source: SL 1970, ch 66, § 3; SL 1973, ch 141; SL 1991, ch 179, § 2.
20-12-6.1. Right to proceed in circuit court or before local commission--Notice as to right of election.
No later than twenty days after notice of a finding of probable cause by the local commission and prior to hearing, the charging party or respondent may elect to have the claims asserted in the charge decided in circuit court in lieu of a hearing before the local commission. Parties shall be notified of their right to election in the notice of finding of probable cause.
Source: SL 1991, ch 179, § 4.
20-12-7. Appeal from local commission.
All decisions of a commission shall be subject to appeal under the same conditions and in the manner provided under §§ 1-26-30 to 1-26-37, inclusive.
Source: SL 1970, ch 66, § 4.
20-12-8. Definition of terms.
Words defined in § 20-13-1 shall have the same meaning when used in this chapter.
Source: SL 1975, ch 165, § 1.
20-12-9. Transfer of complaints to state commission.
Upon the filing of any complaint under the provisions of § 20-12-5, the parties to the complaint shall be notified that any party thereto may, within fifteen days of the date of receipt of the notice of the proceeding, demand as a matter of right that the matter be transferred to the State Commission of Human Rights which shall process the complaint under the provisions of chapter 20-13. Immediately upon receipt of notice of a party's demand to transfer the complaint under this provision, the municipal or county commission on human relations shall forward the complaint to the State Division of Human Rights and shall thereafter have no further jurisdiction with regard to the complaint.
Source: SL 1983, ch 165; SL 1991, ch 179, § 3.
CHAPTER 20-13
HUMAN RIGHTS
20-13-1 Definitions.
20-13-1.1 Probable cause defined.
20-13-2 State Commission of Human Rights--Appointment of members--Terms--Vacancies--Removal.
20-13-2.1 Direction and supervision of commission by Department of Labor and Regulation--Independent functions retained by commission.
20-13-3 Quorum of commission--Rules governing meetings.
20-13-4 Per diem and expenses of commission members.
20-13-5 Employment of personnel by division.
20-13-6 Legal assistance to commission.
20-13-7 Investigation and elimination of discrimination by education and conciliation.
20-13-8 Cooperation with other agencies.
20-13-9 Funds and grants accepted--Accounting.
20-13-10 Unfair or discriminatory practices.
20-13-10.1 Blind or partially blind person--Employment discrimination restricted--Civil penalty.
20-13-11 Employment agency's unfair or discriminatory practices.
20-13-12 Labor organization's unfair or discriminatory practices.
20-13-13 Employment advertising deemed unfair or discriminatory.
20-13-14 Requiring security clearance not unfair or discriminatory.
20-13-15 Use of ability test by employer not unfair or discriminatory.
20-13-16 Seniority and merit preferences permitted--Place of work differentials.
20-13-17 Sex differentiation permitted when based on seniority, job description, merit or executive training systems.
20-13-17.1 Gender preference for hires at single-sex facility not discriminatory.
20-13-18 Qualification based on religious purpose not unfair or discriminatory.
20-13-19 20-13-19. Repealed by SL 1973, ch 142, § 7
20-13-20 Unfair or discriminatory housing practices by owner or agent.
20-13-20.1 Discrimination based on familial status--"Family" defined--Application to housing accommodations.
20-13-20.2 Unfair or discriminatory housing practices based on familial status--Exemptions.
20-13-21 Unfair or discriminatory housing practice by financial institution or lender.
20-13-21.1 Housing--Modifications on behalf of disabled persons unnecessary--Disabled persons not relieved of obligations.
20-13-21.2 Design or construction of multifamily dwellings--Access to housing units and common areas by disabled persons and wheelchairs--Prior approval of plans not required.
20-13-22 Educational institutions' unfair or discriminatory practices--Exemptions.
20-13-22.1 Programs and activities exempt when conducted for educational, social, or recreational purposes.
20-13-22.2 Selection of students to participate in exempt programs permitted--Conduct of programs.
20-13-23 Public accommodations--Unfair or discriminatory practices.
20-13-23.1 Right of disabled persons to equal treatment in public accommodations.
20-13-23.2 Disability--Service Animal--Liability--Violation as misdemeanor.
20-13-23.3 20-13-23.3. Repealed by SL 1986, ch 170, § 19
20-13-23.4 Right to keep guide dog in rented or leased residence--Violation as misdemeanor.
20-13-23.5 20-13-23.5. Repealed by SL 1994, ch 160, § 2
20-13-23.6 20-13-23.6. Repealed by SL 1994, ch 160, § 5
20-13-23.7 Good faith efforts made to accommodate disabled persons.
20-13-23.8 20-13-23.8. Repealed by SL 1993, ch 169
20-13-23.9 20-13-23.9. Repealed by SL 1994, ch 160, § 3
20-13-23.10 20-13-23.10. Repealed by SL 1994, ch 160, § 6
20-13-24 Public services--Unfair or discriminatory practices.
20-13-25 Advertising public accommodations or services--Unfair or discriminatory practices.
20-13-26 Concealing, aiding, compelling, or inducing unlawful discrimination--Threats or reprisals.
20-13-27 Regulations for enforcement of chapter.
20-13-28 Complaints acted upon by division.
20-13-28.1 Dismissal of charge if investigation shows no probable cause.
20-13-29 Charge filed with division--Requirements--Contents--Public officials may file charge.
20-13-30 Charge by employer or organization against employees or members.
20-13-31 Time for filing charge.
20-13-32 Service of charge--Investigation--Conference or conciliation to eliminate practice.
20-13-32.1 20-13-32.1. Repealed by SL 2000, ch 94, § 1
20-13-32.2 Investigative materials confidential--Access to material by parties following determination.
20-13-33 20-13-33. Repealed by SL 1977, ch 184
20-13-34 Notice to respondent to answer charge--Time for answer.
20-13-35 Notice to answer charge after investigating official's report--Time for hearing--Hearing examiner--Right to transfer matter to circuit court.
20-13-35.1 Right to proceed by civil action in lieu of hearing--Forms of relief available.
20-13-36 Administration of oaths--Depositions.
20-13-37 Evidence rules inapplicable at hearings--Cross-examination--Burden of proof--Preservation of testimony.
20-13-38 Presentation of case--Investigating official's participation limited.
20-13-39 Respondent's answer and appearance at hearing--Charging party's intervention.
20-13-40 Amendment of charge or answer.
20-13-41 Proceedings on default by respondent.
20-13-42 Finding of discriminatory or unfair practice--Cease and desist order--Affirmative action required.
20-13-43 Finding of no discriminatory or unfair practice--Dismissal of charge.
20-13-44 Majority of commission required for final orders.
20-13-45 Procedural rules.
20-13-46 Rules governed by general law on administrative rules.
20-13-47 Judicial review of commission--court order for enforcement of order.
20-13-48 20-13-48 to 20-13-51. Repealed by SL 1989, ch 184, §§ 5 to 8
20-13-52 Commission's appearance by attorney--Supervision--Exception in action against governmental agency.
20-13-53 20-13-53. Repealed by SL 1982, ch 16, § 18
20-13-54 Broad construction of chapter.
20-13-55 Severability of provisions.
20-13-56 Citation of chapter.
20-13-57 Antisemitism--Consideration by Division--Definition--Applicability.
20-13-1. Definitions.
Terms used in this chapter mean:
(1) "Commission," the South Dakota State Commission of Human Rights;
(2) "Commissioner," a member of the commission;
(3) "Court," the circuit court in and for the judicial circuit of the State of South Dakota in which the alleged unfair or discriminatory practice occurred;
(4) "Disability," a physical or mental impairment of a person resulting from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder which substantially limits one or more of the person's major life functions; a record of having such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment which:
(a) For purposes of §§ 20-13-10 to 20-13-17, inclusive, is unrelated to an individual's ability to perform the major duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to an individual's qualifications for employment or promotion;
(b) For purposes of §§ 20-13-20 to 20-13-21.1, inclusive, is unrelated to an individual's ability to acquire, rent or maintain property;
(c) For purposes of §§ 20-13-22 to 20-13-25, inclusive, is unrelated to an individual's ability to utilize and benefit from educational opportunities, programs and facilities at an educational institution.
This term does not include current illegal use of or addiction to marijuana as defined in subdivision 22-42-1(7) or a controlled substance as defined in subdivision 22-42-1(1);
(5) "Educational institution," any public or private institution of education and includes an academy, college, elementary or secondary school, extension course, kindergarten, nursery, school system, and any business, nursing, professional, secretarial, technical, or vocational school, and includes any agent of such institutions;
(6) "Employee," any person who performs services for any employer for compensation, whether in the form of wages, salary, commission, or otherwise;
(7) "Employer," any person within the State of South Dakota who hires or employs any employee, and any person wherever situated who hires or employs any employee whose services are to be partially or wholly performed in the State of South Dakota;
(8) "Employment agency," any person regularly undertaking, with or without compensation, to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes any agent of such a person;
(9) "Familial status," the relationship of individuals by birth, adoption, or guardianship who are domiciled together;
(10) "Intern," a student or trainee who works, sometimes without pay, at an organization, industry, trade, or occupation in order to gain work experience or earn academic credit;
(11) "Labor organization," includes any person, employee representation committee, plan in which employees participate, or other organization which exists wholly or in part for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment;
(12) "Person," includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, limited liability companies, corporations, unincorporated organizations, mutual companies, joint stock companies, trusts, agents, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, labor organizations, public bodies, public corporations, and the State of South Dakota, and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof;
(13) "Public accommodations," any place, establishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee, charge, or gratuitously. Public accommodation does not mean any bona fide private club or other place, establishment, or facility which is by its nature distinctly private, except when such distinctly private place, establishment, or facility caters or offers services, facilities, or goods to the general public for fee, charge, or gratuitously, it shall be deemed a public accommodation during such period of use;
(14) "Public service," any public facility, department, agency, board, or commission, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the State of South Dakota, any political subdivision thereof, or any other public corporation;
(15) "Real estate broker" and "real estate salesman," real estate broker and real estate salesman as defined by § 36-21A-6 or as licensed pursuant to § 36-21A-47;
(16) "Real property," any right, title, interest in or to the possession, ownership, enjoyment, or occupancy of any parcel of land, any building situated thereon, or any portion of such building;
(17) "Service animal in training," any dog undergoing individual training to provide specific disability-related work or service for an individual with a disability. Dogs are recognized as being in training to provide disability-specific assistance only after they have completed basic obedience training and are housebroken;
(18) "Service animal trainer," any person who trains service animals for individuals with disabilities as an employee, contractor, or volunteer of a nationally recognized service animal training program
(19) "Unfair or discriminatory practice," any act or attempted act which because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin accords unequal treatment or separation or segregation of any person, or denies, prevents, limits, or otherwise adversely affects, or if accomplished would deny, prevent, limit, or otherwise adversely affect, the benefit or enjoyment by any person of employment, labor union membership, housing accommodations, property rights, education, public accommodations, and public services.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 2; SL 1973, ch 142, § 1; SL 1986, ch 170, §§ 2-3A; SL 1991, ch 179, § 5; SL 1994, ch 351, § 40; SL 2020, ch 70, § 1; SL 2020, ch 71, § 2.
20-13-1.1. Probable cause defined.
For purposes of findings under this chapter, probable cause is defined as a determination that it is more likely than not that the charging party and members of a class, or both, were discriminated against based on a violation of this chapter. The likelihood that discrimination occurred is assessed based upon evidence that establishes a prima facie case, and if the respondent has provided a viable defense, whether there is evidence of pretext.
Source: SL 1996, ch 246.
20-13-2. State Commission of Human Rights--Appointment of members--Terms--Vacancies--Removal.
The State Commission of Human Rights shall consist of five members appointed by the Governor, no more than three of whom may be from the same political party and two of whom shall, in the opinion of the Governor, be experienced in or have a favorable reputation for skill, knowledge, and experience in the management or operations of a business enterprise. Appointments shall take into consideration geographical area insofar as may be practicable. Members appointed to the commission shall serve for a term of four years expiring June thirtieth of an odd-numbered year. Vacancies on the commission shall be filled by the Governor by appointment for the unexpired part of the term of the vacancy. Any commissioner may be removed from office by the Governor for cause.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 3; SL 1976, ch 19, § 9; SL 1983, ch 166, § 1; SL 2011, ch 74, § 5.
20-13-2.1. Direction and supervision of commission by Department of Labor and Regulation--Independent functions retained by commission.
The Commission of Human Rights shall be administered under the direction and supervision of the Department of Labor and Regulation and the director thereof, but shall retain the quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, advisory, other nonadministrative and special budgetary functions (as defined in § 1-32-1) otherwise vested in it and shall exercise those functions independently of the director of human rights.
Source: SL 1973, ch 2 (Ex. Ord. 73-1), § 65; SL 2003, ch 272 (Ex. Ord. 03-1), § 30; SL 2011, ch 1 (Ex. Ord. 11-1), § 33, eff. Apr. 12, 2011.
20-13-3. Quorum of commission--Rules governing meetings.
A quorum shall consist of three members. The commission shall adopt, amend, or rescind such rules as shall be necessary for the conduct of its meetings.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, §§ 3, 4; SL 1989, ch 184, § 1.
20-13-4. Per diem and expenses of commission members.
Members shall receive per diem at the rate provided by law and shall be reimbursed for necessary travel and other expenses incurred while on official commission business.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 3; SL 1973, ch 142, § 2.
20-13-5. Employment of personnel by division.
The Division of Human Rights shall have the following powers and duties:
(1) To appoint and prescribe the duties of such investigators and agents as the division shall deem necessary for the enforcement of this chapter.
(2) To hire any secretarial, investigative, or other assistance that may be necessary to accomplish the commission's purposes.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5 (1), (9).
20-13-6. Legal assistance to commission.
The attorney general shall render such legal assistance and counsel to the commission as may from time to time be required.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 15.
20-13-7. Investigation and elimination of discrimination by education and conciliation.
The Division of Human Rights may investigate and study the existence, character, causes, and extent of discrimination in employment, labor unions, housing accommodations, property rights, education, public accommodations, and public services in this state and attempt to eliminate any discrimination by education and conciliation.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5 (3); SL 1981, ch 166, § 1.
20-13-8. Cooperation with other agencies.
The Division of Human Rights may cooperate with other agencies or organizations, both public and private whose purposes are consistent with those of this chapter, and in the planning and conducting of programs designed to eliminate racial, religious, cultural, and inter-group tensions.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5 (6); SL 1981, ch 166, § 2.
20-13-9. Funds and grants accepted--Accounting.
The Division of Human Rights may receive, administer, dispense, and account for any funds that may be voluntarily contributed to the division and any grants that may be awarded the division for furthering the purposes of this chapter.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5 (8); SL 1981, ch 166, § 3.
20-13-10. Unfair or discriminatory practices.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person, because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin, to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge an employee, or to accord adverse or unequal treatment to any person, employee, or intern with respect to application, hiring, training, apprenticeship, tenure, promotion, upgrading, compensation, layoff, or any term or condition of employment.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6(1); SL 1986, ch 170, § 7; SL 1991, ch 179, § 7; SL 2020, ch 70, § 2.
20-13-10.1. Blind or partially blind person--Employment discrimination restricted--Civil penalty.
No person may refuse to hire a person, discharge an employee, or accord adverse or unequal treatment to any person or employee with respect to the application, hiring, training, apprenticeship, tenure, promotion, upgrading, compensation, layoff, or any term or condition of employment because of their blindness or partial blindness unless specific vision requirements constitute demonstrated and bona fide occupational qualifications necessary for effective work performance and that person's blindness or partial blindness is related to the person's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position. Nothing in this section requires an employer to provide any more than reasonable accommodations for a person's blindness or partial blindness. For the purpose of this section, blindness or partial blindness means legally blind which is 20/200 or less in the better eye with correction or where the field of vision subtends an angle of less than twenty degrees. A violation of this section is punishable by a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars.
Source: SL 1984, ch. 156; SL 1985, ch 15, § 34.
20-13-11. Employment agency's unfair or discriminatory practices.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any employment agency, because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin, to accord adverse or unequal treatment to any person in connection with any application for employment, any referral, or any request for assistance in procurement of employees, or to accept any listing of employment on such a basis.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6(2); SL 1986, ch 170, § 8; SL 1991, ch 179, § 8.
20-13-12. Labor organization's unfair or discriminatory practices.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any labor organization, because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin, to deny full and equal membership rights to an applicant for membership or to a member; to expel, suspend, or otherwise discipline a member; or to accord adverse, unlawful, or unequal treatment to any person with respect to that person's hiring, apprenticeship, training, tenure, compensation, upgrading, layoff, or any term or condition of employment.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6(3); SL 1986, ch 170, § 9; SL 1991, ch 179, § 9.
20-13-13. Employment advertising deemed unfair or discriminatory.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or the employees, agents, or members thereof directly or indirectly to advertise or in any other manner indicate or publicize that individuals of any particular race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin are unwelcome, objectionable, not acceptable, or not solicited for employment or membership.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6(4); SL 1986, ch 170, § 10; SL 1991, ch 179, § 10.
20-13-14. Requiring security clearance not unfair or discriminatory.
Notwithstanding any provision of §§ 20-13-10 to 20-13-13, inclusive, it shall not be an unfair or discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if:
(1) The occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute of the United States or any executive order of the President; and
(2) Such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6 (5).
20-13-15. Use of ability test by employer not unfair or discriminatory.
Notwithstanding any provision of §§ 20-13-10 to 20-13-13, inclusive, it is not an unfair or discriminatory practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test if such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6(6); SL 1973, ch 142, § 3; SL 1986, ch 170, § 11; SL 1991, ch 179, § 11.
20-13-16. Seniority and merit preferences permitted--Place of work differentials.
Notwithstanding any provision of §§ 20-13-10 to 20-13-13, inclusive, it is not an unfair or discriminatory practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, if such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6(6); SL 1973, ch 142, § 4; SL 1986, ch 170, § 12; SL 1991, ch 179, § 12.
20-13-17. Sex differentiation permitted when based on seniority, job description, merit or executive training systems.
Notwithstanding any provision of §§ 20-13-10 to 20-13-13, inclusive, it shall not be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of § 60-12-16.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6 (6).
20-13-17.1. Gender preference for hires at single-sex facility not discriminatory.
Nothing in this chapter prevents a school district from considering the sex of an employee in relation to employment duties in a locker room or toilet facility used only by members of one sex.
Source: SL 2003, ch 122, § 1.
20-13-18. Qualification based on religious purpose not unfair or discriminatory.
Sections 20-13-10 to 20-13-13, inclusive, shall not apply to any bona fide religious institution with respect to any qualifications for employment based on religion when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 6.
20-13-20. Unfair or discriminatory housing practices by owner or agent.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any owner of rights to housing or real property, or any person acting for an owner, with or without compensation, including any person licensed as a real estate broker or salesman, attorney, auctioneer, agent, or representative by power of attorney or appointment, or to any person acting under court order, deed of trust, or will:
(1) To refuse to sell, rent, lease, assign, sublease, or otherwise transfer any real property or housing accommodation or part, portion, or interest therein, to any person because of the race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, familial status, or national origin of the person or persons intending to reside there;
(2) To discriminate against any person because of that person's race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, familial status, or national origin, in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale, rental, lease, assignment, sublease, or other transfer of any real property or housing accommodation or any part, portion, or interest therein;
(3) To directly or indirectly advertise, or to indicate or publicize in any other manner that the purchase, rental, lease, assignment, sublease, or other transfer of any real property or housing accommodation or any part, portion or interest therein, by persons of any particular race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, familial status, or national origin, is unwelcome, objectionable, not acceptable, or not solicited;
(4) To refuse to permit, at the expense of the disabled person, reasonable modifications of existing property that may be necessary to afford full enjoyment of property. The landlord may, where it is reasonable to do so, condition permission for a modification on the renter's agreeing to restore the premises to the condition that existed prior to the modification, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
The provisions of subdivisions (1), (2), and (4) do not apply to rooms or units in dwellings that contain living quarters for no more than two families living independently of each other, if the owner maintains and occupies one of the living quarters as the owner's residence.
This section does not apply to dormitory residences maintained by public or private schools, colleges, and universities for the educational benefit and convenience of unmarried students or to dwellings occupied by fraternities or sororities officially recognized by such institutions. Nothing in this statute may be construed to displace federal, state, or local guidelines setting reasonable standards governing maximum numbers of occupants.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 7; SL 1983, ch 167; SL 1986, ch 170, § 13; SL 1991, ch 179, § 13.
20-13-20.1. Discrimination based on familial status--"Family" defined--Application to housing accommodations.
For the purposes of determining discrimination based on familial status, a family is one or more individuals under the age of eighteen who are domiciled with their parent, legal custodian, or person granted custody with permission of the parent or custodian. This definition includes a person who is pregnant or in the process of securing custody of a person under the age of eighteen years. Discrimination based on familial status applies to housing accommodations only.
Source: SL 1991, ch 179, § 6.
20-13-20.2. Unfair or discriminatory housing practices based on familial status--Exemptions.
The provisions of § 20-13-20 as it refers to familial status do not apply to residences publicized as specifically designated for older or disabled residents and if:
(1) A state or federal program has designated the residences for the elderly;
(2) The residences are intended for and solely occupied by persons sixty-two years of age or older; or
(3) Facilities and services for the residents are designed to meet the needs of the elderly and at least eighty percent of the units are occupied or intended to be occupied by one or more persons fifty-five years of age or older.
Source: SL 1991, ch 179, § 14.
20-13-21. Unfair or discriminatory housing practice by financial institution or lender.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person, bank, banking organization, mortgage company, insurance company, or other financial institution or lender to whom application is made for financial assistance for the purchase, lease, acquisition, construction, rehabilitation, repair, or maintenance of any real property or any agent or employee thereof, to discriminate against any person or group of persons, because of the race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin of such person or group of persons or of the prospective occupants or tenants of such real property in the granting, withholding, extending, modifying, renewing, or in the rates, terms, conditions or privileges of any such financial assistance or in the extension of services in connection therewith.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 7; SL 1986, ch 170, § 15.
20-13-21.1. Housing--Modifications on behalf of disabled persons unnecessary--Disabled persons not relieved of obligations.
Nothing in this chapter requires any person selling, renting, or leasing property, or any person acting for an owner, with or without compensation, including any person licensed as a real estate broker or salesman, property manager, attorney, auctioneer, agent, or representative by power of attorney or appointment, or any person acting under court order, deed of trust, or will, to modify the property in any way, incur any additional expenses or exercise a higher degree of care for a person having a disability than for a person who does not have a disability. Nor does this chapter relieve any person of any obligations generally imposed on all persons, regardless of any disability, in a written lease, rental agreement or contract of purchase or sale, or to forbid distinctions based on the inability to fulfill the terms and conditions, including financial obligations of the lease, agreement, or contract.
Source: SL 1986, ch 170, § 14; SL 1991, ch 179, § 16.
20-13-21.2. Design or construction of multifamily dwellings--Access to housing units and common areas by disabled persons and wheelchairs--Prior approval of plans not required.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice to design or construct any multifamily dwellings with more than four units for sale, rent, lease, assignment, sublease, or transfer that do not enable accessibility to ground-floor common areas and usability of ground-floor housing units by disabled persons or by wheelchairs. If the building has elevators, all housing units and common areas shall be usable by disabled persons and persons in wheelchairs. The accommodations may include widened doors, lowered electrical switches and outlets, lowered environmental controls, grab bars or reinforcements, kitchens and bathrooms usable by the disabled. Nothing in this law may be construed to require prior approval of plans for construction by the Division of Human Rights or the Commission of Human Rights.
Source: SL 1991, ch 179, § 15.
20-13-22. Educational institutions' unfair or discriminatory practices--Exemptions.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any educational institution:
(1) To discriminate in any manner in its full use or in its benefits, or in its services against any individual because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin.
(2) To include, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against any individual seeking admission as a student, or an individual enrolled as a student because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin.
(3) To make or use a written or oral inquiry, or form of application for admission that elicits or attempts to elicit information, or to make or keep a record, concerning the race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, disability, or national origin of an applicant for admission except as may be permitted by regulations of the commission of human rights.
Segregation by sex of athletic activities offered by an educational institution does not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of this chapter if the opportunity to participate in athletic activities offered by the educational institution is substantially equal for both sexes.
This section does not apply to any bona fide religious institution which has a qualification based on religion if such qualification is related to a bona fide religious purpose.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 8; SL 1973, ch 142, § 5; SL 1981, ch 166, § 4; SL 1986, ch 170, § 16.
20-13-22.1. Programs and activities exempt when conducted for educational, social, or recreational purposes.
The provisions of this chapter which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex do not apply to the programs or activities of the following when conducted for any educational, social, or recreational purpose:
(1) Voluntary youth service organizations, the membership of which has been traditionally limited to members of one sex and principally to persons of nineteen years of age or less;
(2) Nationally chartered veterans organizations or any organization, agency, or corporation directly affiliated therewith;
(3) Mother-daughter or father-son activities;
(4) Social fraternities or sororities, the active membership of which consists primarily of students in attendance at institutions of higher education, where living quarters are provided to members;
(5) Any individual officers or members of such organizations or other individuals cooperating therewith in the conduct of such activities or programs as are listed in subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive.
Source: SL 1977, ch 183, § 1; SL 1989, ch 184, § 2.
20-13-22.2. Selection of students to participate in exempt programs permitted--Conduct of programs.
It shall not be considered an unfair or discriminatory practice for any educational institution to promote or aid in the selection of students to participate in programs or activities exempted by § 20-13-22.1 or for such program or activity to be conducted in public or private educational institutions or public accommodations.
Source: SL 1977, ch 183, § 2.
20-13-23. Public accommodations--Unfair or discriminatory practices.
It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person engaged in the provision of public accommodations because of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin, to fail or refuse to provide to any person access to the use of and benefit from the services and facilities of such public accommodations; or to accord adverse, unlawful, or unequal treatment to any person with respect to the availability of such services and facilities, the price or other consideration therefor, the scope and equality thereof, or the terms and conditions under which the same are made available, including terms and conditions relating to credit, payment, warranties, delivery, installation, and repair.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 9(1); SL 1986, ch 170, § 17.
20-13-23.1. Right of disabled persons to equal treatment in public accommodations.
Any person with a disability is entitled to reasonably equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort, and other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
Source: SL 1976, ch 153, § 1; SL 1986, ch 170, § 18.
20-13-23.2. Disability--Service Animal--Liability--Violation as misdemeanor.
Any person who is totally or partially physically disabled, totally or partially blind, totally or partially deaf, or has a psychiatric disability or mental disability may be accompanied by a service animal, especially trained for the purpose, in any of the places listed in § 20-13-23.1 without being required to pay an extra charge for the service animal.
A service animal trainer may be accompanied by a service animal in training wearing a collar and leash, harness, or cape that identifies the animal as a service animal in training, in any of the places listed in § 20-13-23.1 subject to any conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to service animals, without being required to pay an extra charge for the service animal in training.
However, the person with a disability or a service animal trainer is liable for any damage done to the premises or facilities by the service animal or service animal in training. Failure of any owner or employee of a place listed in § 20-13-23.1 to comply with the provisions of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Source: SL 1976, ch 153, § 2; SL 1980, ch 172, § 1; SL 1994, ch 160, § 1; SL 1995, ch 118, § 1; SL 2020, ch 71, § 1.
20-13-23.4. Right to keep guide dog in rented or leased residence--Violation as misdemeanor.
No landlord may prohibit by lease or otherwise the keeping of a service animal by a person who is totally or partially physically disabled, totally or partially blind, or totally or partially deaf in an apartment or other rented or leased residential property. A violation of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Source: SDCL, § 20-13-23.2 as added by SL 1980, ch 172, § 1; SL 1994, ch 160, § 4; SL 1995, ch 118, § 2.
20-13-23.7. Good faith efforts made to accommodate disabled persons.
For purposes of employment, public accommodation, public service, and education or housing, good faith efforts shall be made to reasonably accommodate the disabled person unless the accommodation would impose undue hardship.
Source: SL 1986, ch 170, § 4.
20-13-24. Public services--Unfair or discriminatory practices.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person engaged in the provision of public services, by reason of race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin, to fail or refuse to provide to any person access to the use of and benefit thereof, or to provide adverse or unequal treatment to any person in connection therewith.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 9(2); SL 1986, ch 170, § 20.
20-13-25. Advertising public accommodations or services--Unfair or discriminatory practices.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person directly or indirectly to advertise or in any other manner indicate or publicize that the patronage of persons of any particular race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, disability, or national origin is unwelcome, objectionable, not acceptable, or not solicited.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 9(3); SL 1986, ch 170, § 21.
20-13-26. Concealing, aiding, compelling, or inducing unlawful discrimination--Threats or reprisals.
It is an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly; to conceal any unlawful discrimination; to aid, abet, compel, coerce, incite, or induce another person to discriminate; or by any means, trick, artifice, advertisement, or sign, or use any form of application, or make any record or inquiry, or device whatsoever to bring about or facilitate discrimination; or to engage in or threaten to engage in any reprisal, economic or otherwise, against any person by reason of the latter's filing a charge, testifying or assisting in the observance and support of the purposes and provisions of this chapter.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 10; SL 1981, ch 166, § 5.
20-13-27. Regulations for enforcement of chapter.
The commission shall promulgate rules, pursuant to chapter 1-26, consistent with and necessary for the enforcement of this chapter pertaining to:
(1) The administration of the division;
(2) Complaints, investigations, findings, answers and hearings, and orders;
(3) General commission policies;
(4) Tests in employee selection; and
(5) Discrimination based upon sex, race, religion or creed, origin, ancestry, familial status, or disability.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5(7); SL 1986, ch 22, § 19; SL 1989, ch 185; SL 1991, ch 179, § 17.
20-13-28. Complaints acted upon by division.
The Division of Human Rights may receive, investigate, and pass upon charges alleging unfair or discriminatory practices.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5 (2); SL 1978, ch 153, § 5; SL 1981, ch 166, § 6.
20-13-28.1. Dismissal of charge if investigation shows no probable cause.
If the Division of Human Rights determines there is no probable cause to support the allegations of a charge after an investigation of the charge in accordance with § 20-13-28, the division shall issue an order dismissing the charge. This shall be considered a final agency action for purposes of appeal under chapter 1-26.
Source: SL 1989, ch 184, § 3.
20-13-29. Charge filed with division--Requirements--Contents--Public officials may file charge.
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or unfair practice may file with the Division of Human Rights a verified, written charge which shall state the name and address of the person or agency alleged to have committed the discriminatory or unfair practice. The charge shall set forth the facts upon which it is based, and shall contain any other information required by the division. The Commission of Human Rights, a commissioner, a state's attorney, or the attorney general may file a charge.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (1); SL 1978, ch 153, § 6; SL 1981, ch 166, § 7.
20-13-30. Charge by employer or organization against employees or members.
Any place of public accommodation, employer, labor organization, or person who has employees or members who refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the Division of Human Rights a verified written charge asking the division for assistance to obtain compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (2); SL 1978, ch 153, § 7; SL 1981, ch 166, § 8.
20-13-31. Time for filing charge.
Any charge filed under this chapter shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (15); SL 1981, ch 166, § 9.
20-13-32. Service of charge--Investigation--Conference or conciliation to eliminate practice.
After filing a verified charge, a true copy shall be served by registered or certified mail to the person against whom the charge is filed. A commissioner or a duly authorized Division of Human Rights agent shall promptly investigate the charge. If the investigating official determines that probable cause exists to support the allegations of the charge, the investigating official shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the discriminatory or unfair practice by conference or conciliation.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (3); SL 1981, ch 166, § 10; SL 1987, ch 29, § 25.
20-13-32.2. Investigative materials confidential--Access to material by parties following determination.
Prior to the issuance of a determination under § 20-13-1.1, 20-13-28.1, or 20-13-32, information and materials regarding a charge of discrimination obtained by an investigating official are confidential. Notwithstanding §§ 1-27-29 to 1-27-32, inclusive, after the issuance of a determination and upon receipt of a written request and payment of costs for copying, all investigatory materials may be disclosed to the parties or their counsel of record.
Source: SL 2002, ch 98, § 1; SL 2004, ch 144, § 1.
20-13-34. Notice to respondent to answer charge--Time for answer.
In case of failure to satisfactorily settle a charge by conference or conciliation, or in advance thereof if circumstances so warrant, the official may issue a written notice together with a copy of the charge, as the same may have been amended, requiring the person, employer, employment agency, or labor organization named in the charge, hereafter referred to as respondent, to answer the charge in writing within ten days after the date of the notice or within extended time the investigating official may allow.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (5); SL 1981, ch 166, § 11.
20-13-35. Notice to answer charge after investigating official's report--Time for hearing--Hearing examiner--Right to transfer matter to circuit court.
If the investigating official is satisfied that further endeavor to settle a charge by conference or conciliation is futile, the official shall report the same to the Commission of Human Rights. If the commission determines that the circumstances warrant, it shall issue a written notice requiring the respondent to answer the charge at a hearing to be set within a reasonable period of time before the commission, a commissioner, or any other person designated by the commission to conduct the hearing, hereinafter referred to as hearing examiner, and at a time and place to be specified in the notice. The notice shall include a statement informing the parties of their right to transfer the matter to circuit court as provided in § 20-13-35.1.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (6); SL 1981, ch 166, § 12; SL 1991, ch 179, § 18.
20-13-35.1. Right to proceed by civil action in lieu of hearing--Forms of relief available.
No later than twenty days after the issuance of notice requiring the respondent to answer the charge, the charging party or the respondent may elect to have the claims asserted in the charge decided in a civil action, in lieu of a hearing, under the provisions of this section. Any civil action shall be filed within one year of such election. Upon receipt of notice of election, the Division of Human Rights or the Commission of Human Rights has no further jurisdiction over the parties concerning the charge filed. The Division of Human Rights or the Commission of Human Rights shall notify the parties in writing of the election and of the one year limitation period in which to file a civil action. The limitation period in which to file a civil action begins on the date of the notice of election. In a civil action, if the court or jury finds that an unfair or discriminatory practice has occurred, it may award the charging party compensatory damages. The court may grant as relief any injunctive order, including affirmative action, to effectuate the purpose of this chapter. Punitive damages may be awarded under § 21-3-2 for a violation of §§ 20-13-20 to 20-13-21.2, inclusive, 20-13-23.4, 20-13-23.7, or 20-13-26. Attorneys' fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing party for housing matters.
Source: SL 1991, ch 179, § 20; SL 2004, ch 144, § 2.
20-13-36. Administration of oaths--Depositions.
The commission, any commissioner, or any investigator, agent, or hearing examiner appointed by the division is empowered to administer oaths, and take depositions as provided by §§ 1-26-19.1 and 1-26-19.2.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 5 (4); SL 1973, ch 142, § 6.
20-13-37. Evidence rules inapplicable at hearings--Cross-examination--Burden of proof--Preservation of testimony.
The Commission of Human Rights is not bound by the strict rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity but the right of cross-examination shall be preserved. The charging party bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations in his charge. The testimony taken at a hearing shall be under oath, electronically recorded, or stenographically reported, or both by a commission agent, and transcribed, if ordered by the commission.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (11); SL 1975, ch 166, § 1; SL 1981, ch 166, § 13.
20-13-38. Presentation of case--Investigating official's participation limited.
The case in support of the charge may be presented at the hearing by one of the division's attorneys or agents. The investigating official may not participate in the hearing except as a witness nor may he participate in the deliberations of the Commission of Human Rights in the case.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (7); SL 1978, ch 153, § 8; SL 1979, ch 156; SL 1981, ch 166, § 14.
20-13-39. Respondent's answer and appearance at hearing--Charging party's intervention.
The respondent may file a written verified answer to the charge, and may appear at the hearing in person, with or without counsel, and submit testimony. In the discretion of the hearing examiner, a charging party may be allowed to intervene and present testimony in person or by counsel.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (8); SL 1981, ch 166, § 15.
20-13-40. Amendment of charge or answer.
The Division of Human Rights or the charging party may reasonably and fairly amend any charge. The respondent may also amend his answer.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (10); SL 1981, ch 166, § 16.
20-13-41. Proceedings on default by respondent.
When a respondent has failed to answer a charge at a hearing as provided by § 20-13-39 the Commission of Human Rights may enter his default. For good cause shown, the commission may set aside an entry of default within ten days after the date of the entry. If the respondent is in default, the commission may proceed to hear testimony adduced upon behalf of the charging party. After hearing testimony, the commission may enter any order the evidence warrants.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (9); SL 1981, ch 166, § 17.
20-13-42. Finding of discriminatory or unfair practice--Cease and desist order--Affirmative action required.
If, upon taking into consideration all the evidence at a hearing, the commission finds that a respondent has engaged in, or is engaging in, any discriminatory or unfair practice as defined in this chapter, the commission shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served upon such respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such discriminatory or unfair practice and to take such affirmative action, including hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay; the referring of applicants for employment by any respondent employment agency; the admittance or restoration to membership by any respondent labor organization; the admission to or continuation in enrollment in an apprenticeship program or on-the-job training program; the posting of notices; the making of reports as to the manner of compliance; compensation incidental to the violation, other than pain and suffering, punitive, or consequential damages; costs allowable under chapter 15-17; any other appropriate relief; and reasonable attorneys' fees for housing matters, as in the judgment of the commission effectuates the purposes of this chapter.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (12); SL 1991, ch 179, § 19.
20-13-43. Finding of no discriminatory or unfair practice--Dismissal of charge.
If, upon taking into consideration all of the evidence at a hearing, the Commission of Human Rights finds that a respondent has not engaged in such discriminatory or unfair practice, the commission shall state its findings of fact and serve an order dismissing the charge on the charging party and the respondent.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (13); SL 1981, ch 166, § 18.
20-13-44. Majority of commission required for final orders.
All final orders of the Commission of Human Rights shall be concurred in by at least a majority of the total membership of the commission.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 12; SL 1981, ch 166, § 19.
20-13-45. Procedural rules.
The commission shall establish rules to govern, expedite, and effectuate the procedures established by this chapter and its own actions thereunder.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 11 (14).
20-13-46. Rules governed by general law on administrative rules.
All rules of practice under formal and informal procedures herein provided and all rules and regulations promulgated by the commission shall be in accordance with chapter 1-26.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 17.
20-13-47. Judicial review of commission--court order for enforcement of order.
Any charging party or respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the Commission of Human Rights, including a refusal to issue an order, may obtain judicial review thereof under chapter 1-26.
The commission or party may obtain an order of court for the enforcement of commission orders in a proceeding as provided under chapter 21-34. The court may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees and costs against the respondent. The court also may assess a civil penalty against the respondent in an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars for willful or repeated violations or refusal to comply with an order of the commission.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 13 (1); SL 1981, ch 166, § 20; SL 1989, ch 184, § 4; SL 1991, ch 179, §§ 21, 22.
20-13-52. Commission's appearance by attorney--Supervision--Exception in action against governmental agency.
The commission may appear in court by its own attorney who shall be subject to the supervision, control, and direction of the attorney general, except that the commission's attorney shall not be subject to the supervision, control, and direction of the attorney general where one of the parties to the court action is a political subdivision or agency of the State of South Dakota and that political subdivision or agency is represented by the attorney general.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 13 (5); SL 1973, ch 142, § 8.
20-13-54. Broad construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 14.
20-13-55. Severability of provisions.
If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect the other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 18.
20-13-56. Citation of chapter.
This chapter may be known and may be cited as the "South Dakota Human Relations Act of 1972."
Source: SL 1972, ch 11, § 1.
20-13-57. Antisemitism--Consideration by Division--Definition--Applicability.
In reviewing, investigating, or deciding whether an alleged violation of this chapter is antisemitic, the Division of Human Rights must consider the definition of antisemitism. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "antisemitism" has the same meaning as the working definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance on May 26, 2016, including the contemporary examples of antisemitism identified therein.
Nothing in this section may be construed to diminish or infringe upon any protected right under U.S. Const., amend. I or S.D. Const., Art. VI, § 5, or to conflict with any federal, state, or local discrimination law.
Source: SL 2024, ch 73, § 1.
20-14-1 to 20-14-8. Repealed by SL 2009, ch 108, §§ 1 to 8.
CHAPTER 20-15
ACCESSIBILITY LAW VIOLATIONS
20-15-1 Definitions.
20-15-2 Notice--Civil Action.
20-15-3 Notice--Form.
20-15-4 Notice--Response.
20-15-5 Remedy--Civil Action.
20-15-6 Attorney's Fees--Exemption.
20-15-7 Aggrieved Party--Attorney's Fees.
20-15-1 . Definitions.
Terms used in this chapter mean:
(1) "Accessibility law , " a law that applies to a person with a disability or any federal law that ensures accessibility to websites owned and operated by an entity physically located in the state, services, programs, places of public accommodation, public conveyance and modes of transportation, streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, buildings, medical facilities, and other public places for a person with a disability. The term does not mean any discrimination relating to housing discrimination issues or actions;
(2) "Business day," a day of the week excluding Sunday and a legal holiday.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 1.
20-15-2 . Notice--Civil Action.
Prior to filing a civil action alleging violation of an accessibility law, the alleged aggrieved party may notify the owner, agent, or other responsible party of the property where the alleged violation occurred by personal service, in accordance with applicable state or federal laws, or by certified mail, of alleged accessibility law violations for which an action may be filed by the alleged aggrieved party. If an alleged aggrieved party does not serve notice, the alleged aggrieved party is not entitled to attorney's fees upon the judgment of a civil action alleging violation of an accessibility law unless the trial court determines that attorney's fees are appropriate due to the nature of the violations, including their willfulness, duration, or severity.
For the purposes of this chapter, property includes any website owned and operated by an entity physically located in the state.
If an alleged aggrieved party serves notice in accordance with § 20-15-3, the alleged aggrieved party is precluded from filing such a civil action until one of the following occurs:
(1) The alleged aggrieved party receives a response as described in § 20-15-4 and the property owner, agent, or other responsible party of the property fails to make the improvements or bring the property into compliance with accessibility laws and fails to provide a reasonable explanation for the failure within thirty days as required by § 20-15-4;
(2) The alleged aggrieved party receives a response as described in § 20-15-4;
(3) The alleged aggrieved party receives a response as described in § 20-15-4, but the alleged aggrieved party reasonably believes that the alleged violations continue to exist; or
(4) The property owner, agent, or other responsible party of the property fails to respond to the notice within fifteen business days as required by § 20-15-4.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 2.
20-15-3 . Notice--Form.
A notice provided pursuant to § 20-15-2 shall furnish similar information or be in substantially similar form to the following:
THIS LETTER IS TO INFORM YOU THAT THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT (address of property), FOR WHICH YOU ARE THE PROPERTY OWNER, AGENT, OR OTHER RESPONSIBLE PARTY, MAY BE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL AND/OR STATE ACCESSIBILITY LAWS AND CAUSED HARM TO (name of alleged aggrieved party).
SPECIFICALLY, THE POSSIBLE VIOLATION(S) HAS/HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
(Notice shall identify the specific facts that constitute the alleged violation, including the approximate date on which the alleged violation occurred or was observed and identification of the location of the alleged violation with sufficient detail so that the location can be identified by the property owner, agent, or other responsible party.)
YOU HAVE 15 BUSINESS DAYS TO RESPOND TO THIS NOTICE BY PERSONAL SERVICE OR CERTIFIED MAIL. YOUR RESPONSE SHALL BE ADDRESSED TO (address where personal service may be received or certified mail may be sent). SOUTH DAKOTA LAW ALLOWS YOU TO RESPOND IN ONE OF THREE WAYS:
(1) YOU MAY EXPRESSLY STATE THAT IMPROVEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO BRING THE PROPERTY INTO COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE ACCESSIBILITY LAWS. IF YOU RESPOND IN THIS MANNER, YOU HAVE A MAXIMUM OF 30 DAYS TO COMPLETE THESE IMPROVEMENTS. THE 30-DAY PERIOD SHALL BEGIN ON THE DATE YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS NOTICE IS RECEIVED AT THE ADDRESS GIVEN ABOVE. IF THE IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY TO BRING THE PROPERTY INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE ACCESSIBILITY LAWS ARE NOT COMPLETED WITHIN THE 30-DAY PERIOD, THE ALLEGED AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY BRING A LAWSUIT AGAINST YOU. YOU MAY EXTEND THE 30-DAY PERIOD ONLY IF YOU PROVIDE A REASONABLE EXPLANATION AS TO WHY IMPROVEMENTS CANNOT BE MADE WITHIN 30 DAYS. REASONABLE EXPLANATIONS INCLUDE DEMONSTRATED NEED FOR DELAY, SUCH AS CONSTRUCTION AND PERMITTING RELATED ISSUES.
(2) YOU MAY CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS. IF YOU RESPOND IN THIS MANNER, THE ALLEGED AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY BRING A LAWSUIT AGAINST YOU IMMEDIATELY.
(3) IF THE VIOLATIONS LISTED ABOVE ARE THE SAME AS OR SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS VIOLATIONS THAT YOU BELIEVE HAVE BEEN CORRECTED, YOU MAY RESPOND BY STATING THAT THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BRING THE PROPERTY INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE ACCESSIBILITY LAWS. YOU SHALL ALSO ATTACH EVIDENCE THAT VERIFIES THOSE IMPROVEMENTS.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE OR YOUR RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL OR SOUTH DAKOTA LAW, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 3.
20-15-4 . Notice--Response.
Within fifteen business days after an alleged aggrieved party serves or sends a notice pursuant to § 20-15-2 , the property owner, agent, or other responsible party of the property where the alleged violation occurred shall respond to the notice by personal service or certified mail to the alleged aggrieved party. That response shall:
(1) Expressly state that improvements will be made to bring the property into compliance with applicable accessibility laws;
(2) Challenge the validity of the alleged violation. If the property owner, agent, or other responsible party responds in this manner, the alleged aggrieved party may file an action, subject to any applicable statutes of limitations, any time after receipt of that response; or
(3) State that the alleged violations identified by the alleged aggrieved party have been corrected to comply with applicable accessibility laws. The property owner, agent, or other responsible party shall attach evidence to the response that verifies those improvements.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 4.
20-15-5 . Remedy--Civil Action.
If a property owner, agent, or responsible party of the property where the alleged accessibility law violation occurred responds in the manner described in subdivision 20-15-4 (2), the property owner, agent, or responsible party shall have thirty days to remedy the alleged violation. The thirty-day period shall begin on the date the alleged aggrieved party receives the response described in § 20-15-4 . The owner, agent, or other responsible party may extend the thirty-day period by not more than thirty days upon providing a reasonable explanation as to why the improvement requires more than thirty days to complete. Reasonable explanations include demonstrated need for extension, such as construction and permitting related issues.
If the property owner, agent, or other responsible party of the property where the alleged accessibility law violation occurred responds in the manner described in division subdivision 20-15-4 (1) and makes the improvements to bring the property into compliance with applicable accessibility laws within the thirty-day period described in this section or provides a reasonable explanation as to why those improvements are not completed, the response as described in subdivision 20-15-4 (1) may not be considered an admission of guilt and is inadmissible as evidence in any future actions based on the same facts filed against the property owner, agent, or other responsible party.
If the property owner, agent, or other responsible party of the property where the alleged accessibility law violation occurred fails to make the improvements to bring the property into compliance with applicable accessibility laws within the thirty-day period described in this section and, in the opinion of the aggrieved party, fails to provide a reasonable explanation as to why those improvements are not completed, the alleged aggrieved party may file a civil action for accessibility law violation against that property owner, agent, or other responsible party.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 5.
20-15-6 . Attorney's Fees--Exemption.
In a civil action filed pursuant to § 20-15-5 in which a plaintiff prevails, the plaintiff shall recover reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to any other remedies available to the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees under this section if:
(1) The plaintiff filed the civil action prior to the expiration of an extension invoked by the defendant;
(2) The court determines that the defendant's explanation as to the necessity of the extension was reasonable; and
(3) The defendant makes the improvements to bring the property into compliance with applicable accessibility laws during the period of extension.
If the property owner, agent, or other responsible party where the alleged accessibility law violation occurred makes the improvements to bring the property into compliance with the applicable accessibility laws within the thirty-day period described in § 20-15-5 and provides evidence to the alleged aggrieved party that the improvements have been made, or if the property owner, agent, or other responsible party demonstrates to the court's satisfaction that the explanation given for the necessity of an extension was reasonable, the alleged aggrieved party may not receive any damages or attorney's fees for any action arising out of the same or similar facts that served as a basis for the alleged violation. The alleged aggrieved party may receive damages and attorney's fees for actions arising out of a recurrence of the same or similar alleged accessibility law violation if it is determined that the property owner, agent, or other responsible party failed to maintain accessibility following the initial improvements.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 6.
20-15-7 . Aggrieved Party--Attorney's Fees.
This section may not be construed to limit actions for recovery of special damages filed by any person who suffers an injury in fact because the person was denied full and equal access to an accommodation as required by federal or state law.
This section does not apply to charges filed with the State Commission of Human Rights or deferred to the commission under federal law. This section does not preclude the commission from investigating charges of discrimination against a place of public accommodation.
Source: SL 2020, ch 72, § 7.